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Diversity of Shareholder
Stewardship in Asia: Faux

Convergence
Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh, & Dan W. Puchniak*
ABSTRACT
Since the UK adopted the world's first stewardship code in

2010, stewardship codes have proliferatedacrossAsia. Given the
UK Code's prominence, it is tempting to assume that every other
stewardship code performs the same function as the UK Code.
This assumption belies the truth: all these codes-regardlessof
whether they have in fact drawn inspirationfrom the UK Codehave taken different trajectories due to each adopting its
jurisdiction'sdistinctive institutionaland legal context.
Using empirical evidence and in-depth case studies of
stewardship in Japan and Singapore, this Article reveals how

any reception of United Kingdom-style stewardship concepts is
only skin deep. Even where the text of stewardship codes in Asia
resemble the UK Code in form, their functional impact on
corporate governance significantly departs from, or even runs
counter to, the intended functions of the UK Code. This Article
illustrates how stewardship codes in Asia have been used as a
convenient vehicle for local governments and/or market players
to achieve their own particularinterests through an inexpensive,
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nonbinding, and malleable vehicle, the formal adoption of which
sends a signal of "good corporate governance" to the rest of the
world. While such practices explain and contextualize the
widespread adoption of stewardship codes in Asia, they also
compound the challenge of drawing positive or normative
conclusions from this development. The observation advanced in

this Article is important as leading corporate governance
scholars, prominent international organizations, and market
participants, have appeared content to draw such conclusions,

unaware that stewardship codes generally do not fulfill a similar
function to the UK Code in Asia.
This Article concludes by explaining how adopting globally

recognized mechanisms of "good corporate governance" at a
superficial formal level, and then altering their function to serve
local purposes, appears to be a rising trend in corporate

governance in Asia (and elsewhere). This phenomenon, which we
coin "faux convergence," calls for the reexamination of important
and impactful theories about corporate governance convergence.

As an initialforay, this Article develops an expanded taxonomy
of corporategovernance convergence and lays the foundation for
future researchon "faux convergence."
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INTRODUCTION

When the United Kingdom enacted the world's first stewardship
coded (UK Code) in 2010, the impetus behind it was clear. Institutional

investors had come to hold a substantial majority of the shares in
United Kingdom-listed companies. 2 However, most institutional
investors lacked the incentive to use their shareholder power to
In turn, they were branded as "rationally
monitor management.
passive" shareholders. 4 As the theory goes, left unmonitored by
institutional investors, who collectively controlled the United
Kingdom's shareholder float, the management of United Kingdomlisted companies engaged in excessive risk-taking and short-termism,
which were identified as significant contributors to the 2008 Global

1.
As originally conceived in the United Kingdom, a Stewardship Code is a set
of principles that articulate how institutional investors should behave as stewards of the
capital that they are responsible for investing on behalf of their ultimate beneficiaries.
See Ownership of UK Quoted Shares: 2016, UK OFFICE FOR NA['L STATISTiCS
2.
tbl.
4
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www. ons.govukleconomy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofu
kquotedshares/2016/pdf [https://perma.c/MQH7-KCS5] (archived Mar 17, 2020)
("Beneficial ownership of UK shares by value") (reporting that as of Dec. 31, 2016, 12.3
percent of the beneficial ownership of UK-listed shares was held by individuals, 29.4
percent by institutional investors, 53.9 percent by foreign investors, and 4.3 percent
others); id. at tbl. 5 ("Rest of the world holdings of UK quoted shares by beneficial owner")
(reporting that of the shares held by beneficial owners in North America and the other
parts of "Rest of the World", individuals held 1.4 percent and 1.2 percent, institutional
investors 97.3 percent and 58.8 percent, and others 1.4 percent and 39.9 percent,
respectively) (note that rounding errors exist); see also Paul Davies, Shareholdersin the
United Kingdom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 355, 357-60
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) [hereinafter Davies, Shareholders]
(reporting older data).
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
3.
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 96-100 (2017).
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
4.
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863,
895 (2013); Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism?Mutual Funds and Ownership
Re-concentration in the United States, 5 EUR. MCMT. REV. 11, 19-20 (2008).
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Financial Crisis (GFC). 5 Thus, the original objective, or intended
function, of the UK Code was to motivate institutional investors to
become responsible and engaged shareholders. 6 Specifically, its aim
was to incentivize institutional investors, through the use of soft law,
to act as "good stewards" by exercising their control over listed
companies through their collective voting rights-with the goal of
mitigating the excessive risk-taking and short-termism by corporate
management to avoid another financial crisis. 7
Since the adoption of the UK Code in 2010, stewardship codes and
similar initiatives have proliferated throughout Asia. Asia's largest
developed economy (Japan), Asia's tiger economies (Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), and two of Asia's most
important high-growth economies (Malaysia and Thailand) have all
adopted stewardship codes. 8 Asia's third largest economy (India) has
recently adopted three different stewardship codes, which each target
different segments of the financial industry. 9 Asia's largest economy
(China) recently inserted provisions into its revised corporate
among
governance code to promote shareholder stewardship
institutional investors.10 In addition, several of Asia's most important
developing economies (including Kazakhstan and the Philippines)
have placed the creation of a stewardship code on their corporate
governance reform agendas.i

5.

See, e.g., Iris

H;Y. Chiu

& Dionysia Katelouzou,

From Shareholder

Stewardship to ShareholderDuties:Is the Time Ripe?, in SHAREHOLDER DUTIES 131, 131
(Hanne S. Birkmose ed., 2017); Brian R, Cheffins, The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel,
73 MOD. L. REv. 1004, 1005-06 (2010); Davies, Shareholders,supra note 2, at 373.
Cheffins, supra note 5, at 1014-15.
6.

7.
Jennifer G. Hill Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International
Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497, 506 (2018); Chiu & Katelouzou, supra
note 5, at 135; Cheffins, supra note 5, at 1004-06.
8.
Prepping for the Trend: Stewardship Code Coming to Asia, ISS CoRP. SOLS.
(2019),

https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com/prepping-for-the-trend-stewardship-

&

(archived Feb.
14,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/9WGJ-RMK3]
code-coming-to-asia/
[hereinafter ISS CorporateSolutions].
In India, stewardship codes have been issued by the insurance regulator for
9.
insurance companies, by the pension fund regulator for pensions, and, most recently, by
the securities regulator for mutual finds and alternative investment funds. For a
detailed analysis of these codes and stewardship in India, see Umakanth Varottil,
Shareholder Stewardship in India: The Desiderata, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER
STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou
Dan W. Puchniak eds,, forthcoming 2021).
10.
Katherine Sung, Regime Change Begins at Home: China's New Governance
Code, GLASS LEWIS (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.glasslewis.com/regime-change-begins-athome-chinas-new-governance-code/ [https:/perma.cc/96VG-H3P2] (archived Feb. 14,
2020).
11.
Responsible Shareholder Engagement-A Kazakh Stewardship Code, CITY
UK (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.thecityuk.com/research/responsible-shareholderengagement-a-kazakh-stewardship-code/ [https://perma.cc/Z77M-88L6] (archived Feb.
14, 2020); Securities and Exchange Commission, Philippines Corporate Governance
Blueprint 2015, REPUBLIc OF THE PHIL. 20-21 (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-

2020]
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In this context, it appears that the proliferation of stewardship in
Asia is a shining example of a successful corporate governance
transplant from the United Kingdom to Asia and evidence of the
corporate governance convergence theory. Indeed, one leading
comparative corporate law professor recently declared that Asia has
2
"jumped on the stewardship code bandwagon."1 Two other leading UK
law professors suggest that the widespread transplant of United
Kingdom-style stewardship codes "is likely driven by the [same]
common concerns shared by many jurisdictions." 13 It appears that
and international
market players,
other leading professors,
organizations view the spread of United Kingdom-style stewardship
as one of the most significant developments in global corporate
governance. 14 The assumption is that shareholder stewardship has
been transplanted around the world based on the UK model and aims
to solve the corporate governance problems that the UK Code was
designed to address (i.e., to motivate institutional investors to monitor
corporate management to prevent them from engaging in the type of
excessive risk-taking and short-termism that led to the GFC and, more
recently, to promote an Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)
as all Asian
agenda). 15 This assumption seems reasonable,
jurisdictions that have adopted stewardship codes claim to have been
inspired by the UK Code and, at least based on a superficial textual
analysis, have generally used a similar instrument (stewardship
principles) and broadly similar language in those principles. 16 At this
high level of abstraction, it is not unreasonable to conclude, as many
experts have, that the UK stewardship model has been transplanted
to Asia.1 7

content/uploads/2015/01/SEC_Corporate Governance_BlueprintOct_29 2015.pdf
[https://perma.c/W9YL-HLTP] (archived Mar. 17, 2020).
12.
Hill, supra note 7, at 507.
Chiu & Katelouzou, supra note 5, at 135.
13.
14.
See infra Part 11.
Id. The recently issued UK Stewardship Code 2020 now contains provision on
15.
ESG. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020, FIN. REPORTING COUNcIL 1, 15 (2020),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae59ld-d9d3-4cf4-814a[https://perma.ce/F3F9-C776] (archived
d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-CodeFinal2.pdf
Mar. 17, 2020) ("Principle 7: Signatories systematically integrate stewardship and
investment,

including

material environmental,

social and governance

issues,

and

climate change, to fulfil their responsibilities.").
For a more sophisticated textual analysis of stewardship codes, see Dionysia
16.
Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, Textual Analysis & Networks, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER
STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES, supra note 9. However,
even based on this sophisticated textual analysis, which responsibly includes the caveat
that it does not examine the functionality of stewardship codes, the overall textual
similarities of stewardship codes in Asia - particularly commonwealth Asia - shines
through. It should also be noted that this analysis explicitly does not include the
Singapore Family Stewardship code because of its focus on family ownership and not
institutional investors (i.e., due to its functional difference).
See, e.g. ISS Corporate Solutions, supra note 8 ("Following the formal release
17.
of Stewardship Codes ("the Code") in Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, three

8,34
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However, drilling down deeper beyond the label of stewardship
and a superficial textual analysis, it is clear that there are significant
differences in the function of stewardship (i.e., its intended and actual
impacts on each jurisdiction's corporate governance) between the
United Kingdom and most Asian jurisdictions-and also within Asia.
In fact, in some Asian jurisdictions, shareholder stewardship functions
in a way that appears to run counter to the UK model. 18 As explained
in this Article, the Japanese government adopted a stewardship code
with the aim of reforming its traditional lifetime-employee, riskaverse, and stakeholder-oriented governance system towards a more
less risk-averse
and
profit-maximizing,
shareholder-oriented,
governance system. In Singapore, its stewardship codes appear to be
designed to entrench its successful state-controlled and familycontrolled system of corporate governance. 19 These functions are alien
to the UK model and demonstrate the diversity in the role played by
stewardship codes within Asia.
The fact that stewardship fulfills different functions in Asia than
in the United Kingdom should not surprise. Throughout most of Asia,
controlling shareholders-often families, the state, or other affiliated
or group corporations-have actual or de facto control over the
corporate governance of most listed companies through their voting
rights. 20 Asia's corporate controllers are similar to the United
Kingdom's institutional investors in that they control the shareholder
float in most listed companies in their jurisdictions.2 1 However, the
nature of Asia's corporate controllers is diametrically opposed to the
United Kingdom's institutional investors with respect to the most
stewardship-Asia's
important feature related to shareholder
22
corporate controllers are "rationally engaged shareholders," whereas
the United Kingdom's institutional investors are "rationally passive

other countries including Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand are following suit as a
way of promoting sustainable growth as well as corporate and shareholder value by
means of active voting and constructive engagement. The UK Code is modeled after by
other codes, with nuanced differences.").
See discussion in infra Part IV.C.
18.
See discussion in infra Part IV.B.
19.
Dan W. Puchniak, Multiple Faces of ShareholderPower in Asia - Complexity
20.
Revealed, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER, supra note 2, at 511, 51215, 521-22 [hereinafter Puchniak, Multiple Faces of Shareholder Power in Asia]
(discussing Japan). While Japan has been characterized as a dispersed shareholding
jurisdiction, it has a number of unique characteristics that bring it closer to a block
shareholding jurisdiction. See Gen Goto, Legally "Strong" Shareholders of Japan, 3
MIcH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 125. 144-47 (2014) (explaining
developments in Japan's cross-shareholding arrangements).
21.
Goto, supra note 20, at 144-47. See also infra notes 24 & 41 and
accompanying text (on Asia and the United Kingdom respectively).
22.
See, e.g., Puchniak, Multiple Faces of ShareholderPower in Asia, supra note
20 at, 526-32 (discussing private benefits of control accruing to controlling shareholders
in Asian jurisdictions of China, Japan, and Singapore).

20201
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shareholders."2 3 From this perspective, Asia does not lack "shareholder
stewards" whereas the United Kingdom does. A related important
observation is that although institutional investor ownership has been
on the rise in most Asian jurisdictions, family and state-controlling
24
shareholders continue to dominate public listed companies generally.
Accordingly, in most jurisdictions in Asia, institutional investors do not
have the ability to control-or, perhaps more importantly, to threaten
to change control of-most listed companies.
From an agency costs perspective, it is also well recognized that
in most Asian jurisdictions the primary corporate governance problem
is not the lack of engagement or managerial monitoring by those who
control the shareholder float. 25 Rather, the problem is that the
controlling shareholder is engaged and monitors management for their
own interests, and not necessarily as a "good steward" for the benefit
of minority shareholders, the environment, or society. 26 As a result, the
problems that spawned the UK Code (i.e., excessive risk-taking and
short-termism by unmonitored management), and the solution
provided by the UK Code (i.e., to incentivize institutional investors to
collectively make use of their control over the shareholder float) are
largely absent in Asia. Rather, entrenched management backed by
controlling or affiliated shareholders is the norm, and institutional
shareholders (whether passive or active) most often lack the voting
power to seize control.

23.
See infra Part IL
24.
See Adriana De La Cruz et al., Owners of the World's Listed Companies, ORG.
ECoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV. CAPITAL MKT. SERIES 11-12, 13-16, 35. 37-38 (2019),
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/Owners-of-the-Worlds-Listed-Companies.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/JI)7F-K4DV] (archived Mar. 17, 2020) (based on an analysis of selected
listed companies); ERNEST LIM, A CASE FOR SHAREHOLDERS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
COMMON LAW ASIA 52-59 (2019); Puchniak, Multiple Faces of Shareholder Power in
Asia, supra note 20, at 511, 514, 521-23 (explaining varieties of block shareholdings in
China, Japan, and Singapore). While state and family controlling shareholders do not
generally dominate listed companies in Japan, it is fair to say that institutional investors
do not collectively exercise majority control over most listed companies. See Goto, supra
note 20, at 144-45.
See Puchniak, Multiple Faces of ShareholderPower in Asia, supranote 20, at
25.
524-26 (describing blockholders in Asia).
See LIM, supra note 24, at 41-42 ("If shareholders can exercise corporate
26.
powers for their own benefit at the company's expense, there is a greater risk of doing so
by controlling shareholders in concentrated ownership jurisdictions. . . . I examine the
concentrated ownership structure of the four common law jurisdictions in Asia and
provide concrete examples of how controlling shareholders have engaged in extractions
of private benefits of control to the detriment of the company."); see also Christopher CH.
Chen et al., Board Independence as a Panacea to Tunneling? An Empirical Study of
Related-Party Transactionsin Hong Kong and Singapore, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
987, 988 (2018) ("Tunneling represents a form of agency costs. It poses a significant
problem in the Far East, whose publicly listed companies are dominated by ownership
concentration, thereby raising the possibility of extracting private benefits at the
expense of the company."); Puchniak, Multiple Faces of Shareholder Power in Asia, supra
note 20, at 526-27.

836

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:829

In this context, the original function of United Kingdom-style
stewardship would appear to be largely irrelevant in Asia. This makes
the purported meteoric rise of stewardship codes in Asia puzzling. Why
has a UK corporate governance mechanism, designed for a problem
that largely does not exist in Asia, which provides for a solution that is
largely unavailable in Asia, been implemented throughout Asia? The
short answer is that the rise of United Kingdom-style stewardship has
generally occurred in Asia on a formal level (i.e., the adoption of
broadly similar stewardship principles) but often not on a functional
level (i.e., the intended or actual impact on corporate governance). In

fact, surprisingly, this Article reveals that some of the intended and
actual functions of stewardship codes in Asia significantly depart, or
even run counter to, the intended functions of the UK Code.27
It appears that one of the many reasons for the popularity of
stewardship codes in Asia is that they provide a convenient vehicle for
local governments and/or market players to achieve their own
particular interests through an inexpensive, nonbinding, and

malleable vehicle. The formal adoption of stewardship codes also sends
a signal of "good corporate governance"-as shareholder stewardship
has established itself as an indicia or norm of "good corporate
governance" around the world. While this makes the widespread
adoption of stewardship codes in Asia understandable, it creates a
problem in terms of drawing positive or normative conclusions from
this development. This observation is important as leading corporate
governance scholars, prominent international organizations, and
market participants repeatedly draw such conclusions based on the
erroneous assumption that stewardship codes generally fulfill similar

functions across jurisdictions.2 8
Adopting globally recognized mechanisms of "good corporate
governance" at a superficial formal level and then altering their
function to serve local purposes appears to be a rising trend in
corporate governance in Asia (and elsewhere). 2 9 This trend suggests
that corporate governance convergence at a superficial (i.e., formal)
level is occurring, but that corporate governance remains considerably
local, path dependent, and, ultimately, divergent in practice 30 This
trend has been recently coined as "divergence within convergence" by
Jeffrey Gordon,3 1 who cites the recent research of two of the authors

27.
See discussion in infra Part IV.C.
28.
See discussion in infra Part II.
See Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim, Varieties of Independent Directors in
29.
Asia: A Taxonomy, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE
AND CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 89, 131-32 (Dan W. Puchniak et al, eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2017).
30.
id.
31.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and
Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 28, 29 (Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds,, 2018) ("There has been convergence in many of the

20201
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on the "varieties of independent directors in Asia" as evidence of this
trend.32
The proliferation of "stewardship" throughout Asia also adds a
new layer of gloss to Ronald Gilson's impactful observation about the
difference between formal convergence and functional convergence. 33
At first blush, the rise of stewardship in Asia would seem to challenge
Gilson's observation that functional convergence is likely to develop
before formal convergence because formal convergence is costly. 34 In
Asia, it appears that, at least superficially, "stewardship" has been
formally adopted and that this formal convergence has been rapid and
inexpensive-yet functional convergence has not occurred as
stewardship has functioned to serve divergent local objectives and
interests.35 However, a careful reading of Gilson's work suggests that
he was not contemplating the type of superficial formal convergence
that has occurred with stewardship in Asia and appears to be
increasingly common in other areas of corporate governance. 36 In turn,
as explained in detail in Part V below, rather than challenging Gilson's
theory, the rise of stewardship in Asia (and possibly other similar

formal governance rules but local applications reveal considerable divergence."); id. at
30 ("In 2017, it would also be right to add the role of global governance,' the effort to set
standards flowing from supranational public institutions [in promoting convergence].");
id. at 32 ("Section 4 looks at evidence of divergence, particularly 'divergence within
convergence,' which seems to describe the general state of play."); id. at 41 ("Divergence
takes two forms: The first is a non-following of the convergent norm-for example, not
requiring independent directors. The second, far more common, is divergence within the
convergent norm: "divergent convergence." Evidence of both forms of divergence is found
in the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (2017), a readily accessible current guide
to worldwide corporate law and governance."); id. at 43 ("Do these divergent elements
within a convergent practice matter? The evidence is 'yes, they should.' First, the
particulars of a reform can determine whether it is "high impact" or not."); id. at 44 ("A
more radical version of 'divergence within convergence' is advanced in a recent volume
on independent directors in Asia, which argues both that (1) independent directors are
ubiquitous' in Asia, found in higher proportion across more firms than in the 'West;' and
that (2), functionally, there are 'varieties' of independent directors in Asia, differing
substantially from the US variant and differing even within Asia. Adoption of a
transplant, particularly under pressure of foreign investors or global governance
institutions, does not determine how the new institution will function. That emerges over
time, as the transplant is contextualized within the local ecology, and can lead to
significant divergence in practice.").
32. See generally Puchniak & Kim, supra note 29.
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing CorporateGovernance: Convergence of Form or
33.
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 356 (2001) [hereinafter Gilson, Globalizing Corporate
Governance] ("In this essay, I have surveyed three kinds of corporate governance
convergence: functional convergence, when existing governance institutions are flexible
enough to respond to the demands of changed circumstances without altering the
institutions' formal characteristics; formal convergence, when an effective response
requires legislative action to alter the basic structure of existing governance
institutions.").
Id. at 338 ("Functional convergence is likely the first response to competitive
34.
pressure because changing the form of existing institutions is costly.").
See infra Part V.
35.
36. See infra Part V.
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corporate governance developments in Asia) likely adds a new
category, "faux convergence," to Gilson's helpful convergence
taxonomy. 37 Recognizing and understanding this type of "faux
convergence" is important as it presents challenges for comparative
corporate governance research and calls into question the utility of
efforts by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and the World Bank to promote global/universal mechanisms

for "good" corporate governance.3
The balance of this Article will proceed as follows. Part II provides
a concise overview of the rise of stewardship in the United Kingdom
and explains how the UK stewardship code model is assumed to be the
global model. Part III explains why an examination of stewardship in
Japan and Singapore provides valuable insights into Asia. In Part IV,
the Japan and Singapore case studies will be used to demonstrate how
different they are from the United Kingdom and each other in the way
they function. Part V will discuss the implications of these case studies
for the comparative corporate governance convergence debate, and
Part VI provides a brief conclusion.

II. STEWARDSHIP'S RISE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SPREAD ACROSS
THE GLOBE

The "Anglo-American"3 9 corporate governance model based on the
Berle-Means paradigm of widely dispersed shareholders has been
disrupted by the rise of institutional investors. 40 Today, a modest

See infra Figure 1.
See infra Part V.
39.
That this term has become entrenched in comparative corporate governance
discourse is demonstrated by a Google search of the term "Anglo-American corporate
governance" performed on July 24, 2019, which produced 18,900 results. The label of
"Anglo-American" label is often used as shorthand for the idea that corporate governance
systems in the United Kingdom and the United States have certain characteristics in
common. These include: 1) widely-held and liquid shareholdings; 2) a one-tier (unitary)
model of the board of directors; 3) a so-called "common law" origin; and 4) an overall
orientation that may be termed shareholder primacy. Although substantial differences
(such as in shareholder power) between the two systems exist in both law and practice,
we take the position that "Anglo-American" remains a useful point of departure when
describing the shareholder landscape and context that underlies much of the
comparative corporate law discourse - but which is quite distinct from the situation in
almost every other jurisdiction. For an account and explanation of key differences
between the US and the UK corporate governance systems, see CHRISTOPHER M.
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD THE POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
40.
See, e.g., BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH
BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 345-70 (2008) (describing the factors underlying the rise of
institutional investors in the UK); Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee Jr., Hail
Britannia?:InstitutionalInvestor Behaviour Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV.
37.
38.
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number of institutional shareholders collectively hold enough shares
to exercise effective control over the majority of listed companies in the
United Kingdom 41 and the United States. 42 This phenomenon of
increasingly concentrated shareholding poses a fundamental challenge
to the defining tension (or agency cost problem) between shareholders
and managers that is fundamental to Anglo-American corporate
governance discourse. 43 Concentration of voting power within
relatively few institutional investors makes it theoretically possible for
them to play a critical role in reducing shareholder-manager agency
costs by acting as collective "good stewards" of their investee companies
44
through the exercise of their voting rights.
Yet left to their own devices, however, institutional investors
seemed to do nothing of the sort. Memorably dubbed "the sleeping
giants of British corporate life," 4 5 institutional shareholders have by
46
and large adopted a policy of passivity. Notwithstanding the above,

1997, 2001-07 (1994) (describing the institutionalization of British capital markets with
comparisons to the US).
See De La Cruz et al., supra note, 24 at 37-38 (based on an analysis of 482
41.
listed companies representing sixty-three percent of total market capitalisation in the

United Kingdom, finding that institutional investors held 63 percent of market
capitalisation weighted ownership); Davies, Shareholders, supra note 2, at 357-59. For
latest available figures, see Ownershipof UK quoted shares:2016, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99
42.
B.U. L. REV. 721, 725-26 (2019) ("Over the last fifty years, institutional investors have
come to hold a majority of the equity of U.S, public companies. From 1950 to 2017, the
institutional ownership of corporate equity increased tenfold, from 6.1 percent to 65
percent. As a result, institutional investors now control a large majority of the shares of
public companies and have a dominant impact on vote outcomes at those companies.");
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of
ShareholderActivists in Mahinglt Work, 31 J. APPIIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2019) (reporting
that "by 2009, institutional investors held just over fifty percent of all U.S. public
equities, and seventy-three percent of the equity of the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.");
De La Cruz et al., supranote 24, at 37-38 (based on an analysis of 622 listed companies
representing thirty-one percent of total market capitalisation in the United States,
finding that institutional investors held seventy-two percent of market capitalisation
weighted ownership).
43.
Lucian Bebehuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2048-57 (2019)
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds] (explaining why institutional investors
generate distinctive agency costs); John C. Coates IV, The Future of Corporate
GovernancePart I: The Problem of Twelve 2-5 (Harv. Public Law Working Paper No. 1907, 2019) (explaining how the US approach to agency costs has or needs to evolve in
response to institutional investors).
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 43 (arguing that index fund
44.
managers have incentives to underinvest in stewardship

and defer excessively to

&

corporate managers). But see Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and
Corporate Governance: Let ShareholdersBe Shareholders 33-34, 42-44 (N.Y.U. Law
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 18-39, 2019) (arguing that index fund managers
have incentives to invest in acquiring company-specific information and engage in
company-specific analysis).
See DAVID KYNASTON, CITY OF LONDON: THE HISTORY 434 (2002).
45.
46.
See Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 3, at 96-100 (offering economic
reasons for passivity); Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 43, at 2050-57
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the expectation-or wishful thinking-that institutional investors
would in fact exercise their power as "stewards" persisted among
regulators, policymakers, and scholars alike for decades. 4 7 However, it

was the GFC that caused the United Kingdom to place a greater
emphasis on shareholder stewardship and to make it a pillar of its

corporate governance model. 48
As a response to the excessive risk-taking and short-termism by
listed company management that contributed to the GFC, the UK Code
aimed to create incentives for institutional investors to step up and
play a preventative role. 49 Although the UK Code initially took the
form of a voluntary, opt-in "comply or explain" regime, 50 it was
subsequently made mandatory for every United Kingdom-authorized
asset manager in December 2010 to disclose whether they choose to

(explaining why index funds have incentives to underinvest in stewardship and defer
excessively to management); CHEFFINs, supra note 40, at 377-81 (discussing a mix of
economic and political reasons for passivity); see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at
890-91 (explaining disincentives arising from agency costs of agency capitalism); id. at
889, 895 (arguing that both investment managers and asset owners are "rationally
reticent" in the sense that while they would not on their own initiative on governance
issues but would be responsive to proposals from others).
47. See, e.g., Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere?,
15 J. CORP. LEGAL STUD. 217, 223-25 (2015) (describing the 'alleged success' of the UK
Code put forward by regulators since its inception); Rock & Kahan, supranote 43, at 3334, 42-44 (arguing that index fund managers have incentives to monitor management).
48.
For a concise summary of pre-GFC attempts at addressing stewardship see
Cheffins, supra note 5, at 1007-09.
49,
Arad Reisberg, The Role of InstitutionalShareholders: Stewardship and the
Long/Short-Term Debate, in THE LAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 100, 11314 (Iris H.Y. Chin et al. eds., 2015).
50.
For the original 2010 Code, see UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, FIN. REPORTING

COUNCIL (July 2010), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachmentle223el52-5515-4edc-a951[https://perma.cc/8NB4-GLQC]
da33e093eb28/UK-Stewardship-Code-July-2010.pdf
(archived Feb. 15, 2020). That this was meant to be opt-in comply-or-explain - meaning
that the targets of the Code were free to neither comply nor explain by simply not optingin to the Code - can be inferred from the implementation report released at the same
time. See IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2
https://www.fre.org.uk/getattachment/34d58dbd-5e54-412e-9edb2010),
(July
cb30f21d5074/Implementation-of-Stewardship-Code-July-2010.pdf
[https://perma.c/7YWZ-X6HM] (archived Feb. 15, 2020) ("The FSA will shortly begin
consultation on proposals to introduce a requirement for authorised asset managers to

disclose whether or not they comply with the Code. In the meantime, the FRC would
strongly encourage all institutional investors to publish by the end of September 2010 a
statement on their website of the extent to which they have complied with the Code, and
to notify the FRC when they have done so."). See also id. at 5 ("The Code is addressed in
the first instance to those firms who manage assets on behalf of institutional investors.
The FSA is expected to begin consultation in July 2010 on proposals to introduce a
"comply or explain" disclosure requirement that would apply to those firms authorised
by the FSA to manage assets on behalf of institutional investors. The FRC expects those
firms to disclose on their websites to what extent they have complied with the Code, and
how they have done so."). The use of the words "strongly encourage" and "expects" reveal
that the regime was not intended-at least upon inception of the UK Code-to be
mandatory. Id. at 2, 5.

DIVERSITY OFSHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP IN ASIA

2020]

841

comply or explain. 5 1 Later, in a bid to "improve the quality of reporting
against the Code, encourage greater transparency in the market and
maintain the credibility of the Code," the Financial Reporting Council
(FRC) conducted a grading exercise (called "tiering") by which they
classified UK Code signatories into three "tiers" according to the
quality of their statements on their approaches to stewardship and,
where they have departed from the code, their explanations for doing
so. 52 The FRC subsequently removed the lowest Tier 3 category in
August 2017,53 but in the process about twenty out of the forty asset
managers graded as Tier 3 removed themselves as UK Code
signatories.54
Despite these changes in the form of implementation, what the
UK Code has been consistently criticized for has been its failure to
provide adequate incentives to motivate institutional shareholders to
act as "good stewards." 55 As Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott
Hirst argue in an article that has gained significant attention, asset
managers (who compete fiercely on relative performance) have almost
56
no incentives to engage actively with investee company management.

UK STEWARDsHIP CODE 2020, supra note 15 ("Asset managers are required
51.
under the FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS) to develop and explain how they
have implemented an engagement policy for their listed equity investments, including
how they monitor investee companies, their voting behaviour and their use of proxy
advisors."); FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK, r,
2.2.3 (Feb. 2020): "Disclosure of commitment to the Financial Reporting Council's
Stewardship Code. A firm, other than a venture capital firm, which is managing
investments for a professional client that is not a natural person must disclose clearly on
its website, or if it does not have a website in another accessible form: (1) the nature of
its commitment to the Financial Reporting Council's Stewardship Code; or (2) where it
does

not

commit

to

the

Code,

its

alternative

investment

strategy."

[https://perma.cc/H7FW-9HGN] (archived Feb. 24, 2020). Curiously, but no direct
reporting obligations as to compliance with the UK Code was imposed on foreign
investors notwithstanding their dominating presence in the UK's public equity markets.
52. TIERING OF SIGNATORIES TO THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, FIN. REPORTING
COUNCIL (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.frc.org.uk/news/november-2016/tiering-ofsignatories-to-the-stewardship-code [https:lperma.ec/2A4F-FDNR] (archived Feb. 20,
2020).
53. FRC REMOVES TIER 3 CATEGORISATION FOR STEWARDSHIP CODE SIGNATORIES,
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.fre.org.uk/news/august-2017/frcremoves-tier-3-categorisation-for-stewardship [https://perma.cc/2LUP-L6XH] (archived
Feb. 20, 2020).
Id.
54.
The UK Code's lack of coercive force has since been and continues to be a
55.
source of much criticism. See Cheffins, supra note 5, at 1025 ("Correspondingly, even if
the Stewardship Code fails to fulfil the objectives of its proponents, without additional
study it would be unwise to replace its mixed comply-or-explain and voluntary approach
with mandatory regulation designed to foster shareholder activism."); Reisberg, supra
note 47, at 240-41 (discussing the lack of an enforcement mechanism for the
Stewardship Code).
See Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 3, at 96-100 (neither passively nor
56.
actively managed mutual fund managers have incentives to engage in stewardship than
would be portfolio value-maximizing); id. at 102-03 (investment managers have active
disincentives to oppose management).
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From this perspective, stewardship codes are unlikely to have a
significant impact without addressing the incentive deficit for
"stewards,"5 7 regardless of whether their objective is to build long-term
value, act in the public interest, or something else.
What began as a code for a single country (the United Kingdom)
quickly took on a life of its own in spite of detractors. 58 As Jennifer Hill

pertinently observed, the UK Code's bold claims that "[s]tewardship
aims to promote the long term success of companies ... [and] [e]ffective
stewardship benefits companies, investors and the economy as a
whole" 59 "proved alluring from a comparativist standpoint, providing
clear incentives for transplantation." 6 0 At least formally, it appears
that the UK Code sparked a global stewardship movement, with
broadly similar codes and other initiatives now existing in at least
eighteen jurisdictions over five continents-with many other
jurisdictions also placing shareholder stewardship on their corporate
governance reform agendas. 1
Yet amidst all this activity, what is conspicuously missing is any
serious attempt to identify the precise actors in each national corporate
governance context and define the subject(s) and goal(s) of stewardship
in each. Put simply, the question that has not yet been fully explored
is: What is the intended and actual function(s) of stewardship in Asian
jurisdictions, and does this depart from the original UK stewardship
model? Instead, what largely prevails is an implicit assumption that
the intended and actual functions of "stewardship" in Asia has been
(and is) similar to the United Kingdom.
Two leading United Kingdom-based scholars, who have been
active in United Kingdom and European stewardship discourse, have

Id. at 108 ("stewardship codes putting forward aspirations, principles, or
57.
guidelines are likely to have less of an impact than if investment managers had
appropriate incentives.").
58.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Owen Walker, Beacon of
British stewardship needs a brighter flame, FIN. TIMEs (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/la3a57be-5c 15-3e03-bae0-10bd5804bf20
[https://perma.cc/JY7A-7VB3] (archived Apr. 2, 2020).

59. THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 1 (Sept. 2012),
https://www.frc.org. uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UKStewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf [https://perma.cc/4F2B-FLFC] (Archived Feb.
15, 2020).
60.
Hill, supranote 7, at 506-07.
61. See ISS Corporate Solutions, supra note 8 ("Following the formal release of
Stewardship Codes ("the Code") in Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Taiwan, three other
countries including Singapore; South Korea, and Thailand are following suit as a way of
promoting sustainable growth as well as corporate and shareholder value by means of
active voting and constructive engagement. The UK Code is modeled after by other codes,
with nuanced differences.") see also Q&A on Stewardship Codes, ERNST & YOUNG (Aug.
2017),
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-stewardship-codes-august2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf
[https:Hperma.c/9PLQ-PCST]
(archived Feb. 15, 2020); Kerrie Waring, Investor stewardship and future priorities,
ETHICAL BOARDROOM (2017), https://ethicalboardroom.com/investor-stewardship-andfuture-priorities/ [https://perma.cc/E9GJ-VFMF] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
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readily assumed that stewardship globally is the same as stewardship
in the United Kingdom and is driven by the same factors as in the

United Kingdom:
However, the [UK] Code has since taken its place in the transnational
governance space and inspired international developments in the institution of
Stewardship Codes in many other countries, including the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Japan and Malaysia. the gradual internationalisation of soft law
governance obligations of stewardship on the basis of the UK Stewardship Code
is likely to be driven by the common concerns shared by many jurisdictions with
listed markets in relation to the increasing presence of institutional investors
(especially foreign ones) in their markets and the potentially active role they can
play. 6 2

Scholars in the United States have also been content to proceed

based on a monolithic view of stewardship based on the UK model.
Jeffrey Gordon has identified a global shift away from "efficiency" and
towards political and social "stability" as the end goal of corporate
governance. 63 Among those interested in stability are large
institutional investors due to their diversified portfolios and long-term
65
64
horizons, as well as "global governance" institutions. Together with
resistance against short-termist hedge funds, Gordon points to the
global stewardship movement as a manifestation of the increasing
concern with stability.6 6 Gordon's vision of stewardship-as promoting
long-term shareholder value and as a bulwark against short-term

Chin & Katelouzou, supra note 5, at 135. See also Iris H.Y. Chiu, Learning
62.
from the UK in the Proposed Shareholders'Rights Directive 2014? European Corporate
Governance Regulation from a UK Perspective, 114 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE
RECHTSWIsSENSCHAFT 121, 150-51 (2015) ("Further a number of authoritative bodies
such as the Italian stock exchange and the Swiss International Investor Association have
adopted and adapted the Code, as well as the Japanese National Pension Fund and
Malaysian stock exchange. The Japanese Code is remarkably similar to the UK's except
that it emphasises the constructive dialogue between investors and companies, in the
tradition of communitarian harmony important to Japanese tradition, and it compels
investors to engage in an in-depth knowledge of investee companies in order to support
engagement.. . The Malaysian Institutional Investor Code to drive Stewardship . .. is
also remarkably similar to the UK Code except that institutional investors are to
explicitly consider corporate governance and sustainability (environmental, social and
governance) issues in their engagement."),
"This is demonstrated by the growing global governance movement for
63.
'Stewardship Codes' and the concerted campaign against the purported 'short-termism'
of hedge funds." Gordon, supranote 31, at 54. Interestingly, Gordon also suggests "family
shareholding groups," especially those planning for future generations, value stability.
Id.
64.
Such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. See id. at 45.
Id. at 54.
65.
66.
Id.
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hedge fund activism-exemplifies the conventional understanding of
global stewardship based on the UK model. 67
Reports in the popular press almost uniformly assume that
stewardship movements across the world follow the UK model
closely. 6 8 What is more troubling is the fact that the OECD, a key actor
in global governance, has done largely the same. 69 In the G20/OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance, institutional shareholders are

called on to

"disclose their policies with respect to corporate

governance," and the adoption of voluntary stewardship codes was
cited in connection. 70 By the time the OECD Survey of Corporate
Governance Frameworks in Asia was released in 2017, stewardship
had become yet another box to tick, nestled under "[e]xercising voting
rights" as a subset of "[g]overnance-related responsibilities of

67. See also Gilson & Gordon, supranote 4 (premising its argument on "rationally
reticent" institutional shareholder behaviour, the solution to which is arbitrage by a
class of actors specializing in activism).
68.
See, e.g., Fiona Reynolds, Stewardship codes guide best practice, INV.
MAGAZINE (Sept. 2017), https://www.investmentmagazinecom.au/2017/09/stewardshipcodes-guide-best-practice/ [https://permacc/W43NT345] (archived Feb. 15, 2020)
("Australia can then join a long list of countries that have already developed stewardship
codes in recent years, including the UK, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
the European Union, the US, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines, South Korea,
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Brazil and Singapore. // For many countries, stewardship
codes can help foster sustainable, long-term growth and attract foreign investors which
feel that stewardship codes can help ensure better corporate governance."); Schroders,
Schroders sees wide adoption of stewardship codes in Asia, ASIAN INV'R (July 16, 2018),
https://www. asianinvestor.net/article/schroders-sees-wide-adoption-of-stewardshipcodes-in-asia/445470 [https://perma.cc/B9HK-ESWV] (Archived Feb. 15, 2020) ("[The
UK Stewardship Code] sets the standard for investors in terms of monitoring and
engaging with companies that improve corporate governance... . Asia is one region
where these standards have been widely adopted. ... Elsewhere, Singapore, Taiwan and
Australia have their own versions, in response to a clear sign from regulators that they
want investors to hold companies to account and encourage better performance.");
Amanda White, Top US funds embrace stewardship code, TOP1000FUNDS (Feb. 17,
2017), https://www.top1000funds.com/2017/02/top-us-funds-embrace-stewardship-code/
[https://perma.cc/27RT-R7HM] (archived Feb. 15, 2020) ("Six of the 14 countries that
have developed stewardship codes since 2014 are in Asia, the PRI states. Codes have
typically been modelled after the UK Stewardship Code; they set out principles that aim
to improve engagement between investors and companies to help improve long-term,
risk-adjusted returns."); Masayuki Yuda, Shareholders find their voice at Japan's
REV.
(July
12,
2018),
meetings,
NIKKEI
ASIAN
annual
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Shareholders-find-their-voice-at(archived Feb. 15, 2020)
Japan-s-annual-meetings [https://perma.cc/8VHX-Z46F]
("Modeled on British versions, these initiatives [the Japanese corporate governance and
stewardship codes] are shaking things up."); Walker supra note 58 ("[The UK Code]
turned the UK into a leader in corporate oversight but it has since been overtaken by
foreign imitators. . .. Many countries have followed the UK's lead, with more than 20
codes in place.").
69.
ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & Dav., G20/OECD PRINcIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 29-30 (2015), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264236882en.pdf?expires=1581819735&id=id&acename=guest&cheksum=AB7DD38F2DDFE706
1573FE766D969722 [https://perma.cc/W3YP-BQMW] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
70.

Id.
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institutional investors" 7 1 Despite observing in an earlier section that
thirteen out of the fourteen Asian jurisdictions surveyed had
concentrated shareholding structures, 72 nowhere in this document was
the importance (or lack thereof) of "institutional investors" explained
nor "stewardship" defined nor its function explained with respect to
each jurisdiction's context. The irresistible inference is that the
authors had, consciously or not, implicitly assumed that all these
stewardship-implementing jurisdictions understood stewardship in
the same way because their stewardship codes were all seemingly

modeled on the UK Code.
Even sophisticated governance and legal professionals are not
3
immune to the uniform stewardship assumption.7 A recent example

is Ernst & Young's (EY) Q&A on Stewardship Codes. 74 EY cannot be
faulted for clarity, as it states clearly its view of what stewardship
codes are7 5 and how they are applied, following the orthodoxy set by
the UK Code.7 6 Yet there is nothing in the document to suggest that
the existence of shareholders other than institutional investors-or the
governance-is
in corporate
investors
of institutional
role

contemplated.
Another telling example comes from Institutional Shareholder
77
Services, the world's leading proxy advisory firm:
Following the formal release of Stewardship Codes ("the Code") in Japan,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, three other countries including Singapore,
South Korea, and Thailand are following suit as a way of promoting sustainable

71.
ORG. ECON. Co-OPERATIoN & DEV., OECD SURVEY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA 27 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-

[https://perma.cc/9RCE-UXHG]
Survey-Corporate-Governance-Frameworks-Asia.pdf
(archived Feb. 15, 2020).
Id. at 5-6. The exception was Mongolia, on which nothing was said about
72.
shareholding structure other than that a majority of listed companies may be considered
non-state-owned. Id. at 6. Of the thirteen concentrated shareholding jurisdictions, only
China was identified as having substantial institutional investor ownership (at 19.86
percent). Id. at 5.
See, e.g., Ruth Sullivan, UK seen as model for stewardship guidelines, FIN.
73.
https:/www.fticom/content/Oe0bbc50-9c02-11df-a7a41,
2010),
(Aug.
TIMES
00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/HH4J-V5D4] (archived Mar. 17, 2020) ("Ms. Waring
believes it is too early to expect consistency between different stewardship or governance
codes. But sharing basic principles on voting, monitoring and disclosure, as
recommended by the ICGN, would provide a good shared basis, she says, adding: 'The
UK code could well be a model [for other countries]')" Kerrie Waring was then COO at
the International Corporate Governance Network. Id.
See Q&A on Stewardship Codes, supra note 61.
74.
75. Id. at 2 ("[Stewardship] codes .. , aim to clarify basic governance expectations
and responsibilities in ways that enhance the quality of investor-company dialogue and
contribute to the long-term success of companies.").
Most
76. Id. ("Stewardship codes typically apply to institutional investors ..
stewardship codes are voluntary. This means institutional investors are encouraged to
become code signatories and to disclose their commitment to the code's principles, where
relevant.").
77. ISS CorporateSolutions, supra note S.
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growth as well as corporate and shareholder value by means of active voting and
constructive engagement. The UK Code is modeled after by other codes, with
nuanced differences. 7 8

Even actors personally involved in implementing stewardship
projects in their respective jurisdictions can portray themselves as
following in the United Kingdom's footsteps without interrogating the

fundamentals of what stewardship means for their respective contexts.
In their 2016 book Inspiring Stewardship, Didier Cossin and Ong Boon
Hwee 7 9 declared:
Led by the development in the United Kingdom of a stewardship code in 2010, a
number of other countries are developing similar codes (Japan, Singapore, South
Africa, and others) to address this area and to define the scope of these
responsibilities of ownership .80

There is an element of irony in this characterization; as shall be
seen later, the intended and actual functions of Singapore's own
stewardship code ultimately turned out to be little like the United
Kingdom's. 8 In fact, in many respects, the manner in which
stewardship functions in Singapore has turned the UK model of
stewardship on its head-and, in many important respects, functions
differently from any other jurisdiction in Asia.8 2
There are exceptions to the overall tendency to characterize
stewardship in other jurisdictions as essentially the same as in the
United Kingdom, of which Hill's 2018 article is a notable example.
While noting that "[s]tewardship codes reflect the view that
engagement by institutional investors is an integral part of any
corporate governance system" 8 and that many Asian and other

jurisdictions have "jumped on the stewardship bandwagon," 8 4 Hill
proceeds to classify stewardship codes into three major categories by
their source 8 5 and discusses key differences between the UK and

78.

Id.

79.

They are respectively a business school professor, and a former brigadier-

general in the Singapore armed forces as well as the CEO of the body that created
Singapore's stewardship code. The story of Singapore's stewardship code is set out in full
in Dan W. Puchniak & Samantha S. Tang, Singapore's Puzzling Embrace of Shareholder
Stewardship: A Successful Secret, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 967 (2020) and summarized
in Part IV.B below.
80.
See DIDIER COSSIN & ONG BOON HWEE, INSPIRING STEWARDSHIP 46 (2016).
81.
See discussion in infra subpart IV.B. (noting the dissimilarities between
Singapore's stewardship code and the United Kingdom's).
82.
See infra subpart IV.B. (discussing the features that are distinctive to
Singapore's stewardship code).
83.
Hill, supra note 7, at 506.
Id. at 507.
84.
85.
See id. (regulatory- or quasi-regulator-issued); id. at 508 (private industry
actors); id. at 509 (investors).

2020]

DIVERSITY OFSHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP IN ASIA

847

Japanese codes.8 6 Although Hill correctly identifies the difference in
87
policy objectives between the two codes, she does not go so far as to
consider the alternative possibility that stewardship itself means
different things in these two jurisdictions. In a subsequent article, Hill
summarized recent developments in Asia as follows: "Japan adopted
its own Stewardship Code, based on the U.K. model, in 2014, and many
other Asian jurisdictions have now followed suit.'' 88

Similarly, while there is clear awareness in the ICGN Global
Stewardship Principles that "there are different models of corporate
finance and ownership of listed companies around the world" and
"[family or state owned corporate models] can differ in very basic
principles such as shareholder primacy versus stakeholder primacy,
and may require deeper consideration in terms of how stewardship can
be effectively applied," 89 there is no further consideration of whether
stewardship itself can stand as a more-or-less singular concept when
applied to clearly different jurisdictional contexts.
Is the basic stewardship problem as understood in the UK
stewardship discourse necessarily shared by the other jurisdictions
that now form part of the global stewardship movement? First consider
the hard facts. Most listed companies in jurisdictions other than the
United Kingdom (or United States) are under the de facto (if not
outright de jure) control of families, states, or other corporations that
are controlling blockholders. 90 Given the dominance of controlling

See id. at 513-22 (comparing and contrasting the features of the stewardship
86.
codes in Japan and the United Kingdom).
See id. at 520 ("A central policy factor underpinning the U.K. Stewardship
87.
Code was the need for effective risk control in the post-crisis era. The Japanese version,
however, was far more focused on arresting declining profitability, unlocking value, and
increasing investor returns.").
Jennifer Hill, The Trajectory of American CorporateGovernance:Shareholder
88.
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, 2019 U. ILL.. L. REV. 507, 516 (2019).
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN GLOBAL
89.
STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES - GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP PRINcIPLES AND ENDORSERS 23
https://wwwiegn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pdf
(2016),
[https://perma.ce/NSR4-PRPT] (archived Feb. 3, 2020).
See; e.g., De La Cruz et al., supra note 24, at 11-12, 37-38 (2019) (reporting
90.
data about types of investors based on an analysis of selected listed companies in Asia
and countries other than the US and UK). While state and family controlling
shareholders do not generally dominate listed companies in Japan, it is fair to say that
institutional investors do not collectively exercise majority control over most listed
companies. See Goto, supra note 20, at 144-45 (analyzing data from the Tokyo Stock
Exchange regarding the types of investors in the exchange); see also Clifford G.
Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
1377, 1405-06 (2009) ("First, although many believe that the United States has diffuse
ownership, the evidence is to the contrary. Among a representative sample of U.S. public
firms, 96 percent of them have blockholders. These blockholders in aggregate own an
average of 39 percent of the common stock. Second, although virtually all commentators
believe that ownership in the United States is more diffuse than elsewhere, again the
evidence is to the contrary. The ownership concentration of U.S. firms is similar to likesized firms elsewhere. On a country-by-country basis, the United States falls in the
middle of the pack.").
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shareholders in many jurisdictions, institutional shareholders control
only a minority of the total voting power of listed companies.
Consequently, institutional shareholders in most jurisdictions have
little power to cause a change in corporate control or make a credible

threat to do so.
Given these facts, instead of an "absent" steward, the principal
corporate governance problem in these jurisdictions may be better
characterized as the risk of an entrenched controlling shareholder
using their very real power not to discharge the function of a steward,
but rather to extract private benefits of control at the minority
shareholders' expense 9 1 Why would a jurisdiction like that possibly
jump on the stewardship bandwagon? Or is something else going on
under the innocuous label of "stewardship"?

On the other hand, even in the relatively uncommon case of a
jurisdiction without a predominance of controlling block shareholders,
it is not necessarily the case that substantial shareholders behave
passively and fail to engage in corporate governance. In fact, active
shareholders may well take-under at least some conditions-a

promanagement, pro-long-term position even at the cost of immediate
short-term disadvantage. An example would be long-term stable
shareholders rallying to the defense of incumbent management against
a concerted attack by a short-termist hostile raider in Japan. 9 2 Why
would substantial, yet dispersed, shareholders ever do this? And why

would such a jurisdiction introduce what would seem at first glance to
be a United Kingdom-style stewardship code? The next Part answers
these questions through a pair of case studies: Japan and Singapore.

III.

STEWARDSHIP THROUGH ASIAN LENS(ES): THE CONTRIBUTION OF
JAPAN AND

SINGAPORE CASE STUDIES

As demonstrated in Part II above, despite the appearance of a

"global" stewardship movement, the reality of stewardship as it has
manifested in each jurisdiction implementing it-or
considering it-is
much more complex. To make the case for Asia, this Article examines
two case studies, each featuring one Asian jurisdiction.
Japan and Singapore have been selected for this Article for several
reasons. First, Japan and Singapore are both leading economies in

91. See Puchniak, Multiple Faces of ShareholderPower in Asia, supra note 20, at
526-27 (observing that extraction of private benefits of control in Asia may take a
different form from the Anglo-American paradigm).
92.
See Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile
Takeovers in Japan:Bidder Beware, 15 BERKELEY Bus, L.J. 4, 36, 38 (2018) (discussing
the Bulldog Sauce case); id. at 30-31 (discussing Livedoor); see also Dan W. Puchniak,
The Efficiency of Friendliness:Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without
Hostile Takeovers, 5 BERKELEY Bus, L.J. 195, 246-50 (2008) (discussing the Oji Paper
incident).

2020]

DIVERSITY OFSHAREHOLDERSTEWARDSHIP IN ASIA

849

Asia, which at various times have been potential models of corporate
governance for the region and the world-and have, on a number of
metrics, reached the zenith of economic performance in modern
times.9 3 For this reason, they both have often been featured in leading
94
comparative corporate law and governance scholarship. Second, they

93. Through the postwar period, Japan has been a leading economy in Asia and
the world, and a model of corporate governance for countries such as the United States,
see, e.g., Puchniak, Multiple Faces of ShareholderPower in Asia, supra note 20, at 521
(observing how in four post-war decades, Japan transformed itself from a country
decimated by war to having a GNP per person in 1988 that was higher than that of the
United States); see also Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of American Corporate
Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending History for CorporateLaw Asian-PacificLaw
& Policy Journal, 9 PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 7, 17-18 (2007) [hereinafter Puchniak,
Japanizationof American CorporateGovernance] (observing how in the 1980s and early
1990s Japan was seen as having a world-leading corporate governance model).
Singapore's economy is one of the most competitive, dynamic, and wealthy in the world.
See Dan W. Puchniak & Luh Luh Lan, Independent Directors in Singapore:Puzzling
Compliance Requiring Explanation, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 265, 298 (2017) (collecting
sources demonstrating the robustness of Singapore's economy). Singapore's model of
corporate governance has been considered by the Chinese government for adoption in
the reform of their state-owned enterprises. See, e.g., Tan Cheng Han et al., State-Owned
Enterprises in Singapore: Historical Insights into a Potential Model for Reform, 28
COL.UM. J. ASIAN L. 61, 62-63 (2015) (observing that the Chinese government decided
that by 2020, the Singapore GLC Model would be replicated in China 30 times over); see
also e.g., Gabriel Wildau, China deploys state enterprisesto economic stimulus effort, FIN.
https://www.ft.com/content/3dlOe5ce-3754-11e6-a7802016),
21,
(June
TIMES
b48ed7b6126f [https://perma.cc/2REW-XMZF] (archived Feb. 3, 2020) (describing
China's strategy regarding the use of state-owned enterprises); From SOE to GLC,
ECONOMIST

(Nov.

23,

2013),

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-

economics/2013/11/23/from-soe-to-gle [https://perma.cc/HKR6-576H] (archived Feb. 3,
2020) (reporting that the Chinese Government is following the Temasek model).
94.
For analyses by leading corporate law scholars featuring Japan, see, e.g.,
JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d. ed. 2017); John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile
Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52
HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 221-23 (2011) (assessing the emergence of the hostile takeover
mechanism in Japan, as well as the United States and the United Kingdom); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2172-77 (2005) (discussing the increased occurrence of hostile
takeovers in Japan in the early 2000s); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of
the Keiretsu, 11 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 169, 169-72 (2002) (analyzing the validity
of the concept of the keiretsu in Japanese economics); Goto, supra note 20, at 126-28
(examining the extent and consequences of the rights of the shareholders of Japanese
corporations); see also Alan K. Koh, Appraising Japan's Appraisal Remedy, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 417, 418-21 (2014) (exploring the law of the shareholder remedy of appraisal
in Japan). Japan has also found a following even amongst scholars who do not otherwise
have special training or expertise in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark
J. Roe, The PoliticalEconomy of Japanese Lifetime Employment, in EMPLOYEES AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 239-307 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999)
(discussing Japanese corporate governance extensively). Analyses featuring Singapore
are comparatively more recent. See, e.g., CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW
AND CAPITALISM 125-48 (2008) (assessing economic growth in Singapore); Tan et al,
supra note 93, at 61-65 (assessing the features of the Singapore model of corporate law);
Luh Luh Lan & Umakanth Varottil, Shareholder Empowerment in Controlled
Companies: The Case of Singapore, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF SHAREHOLDER POWER
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are both developed countries, which makes comparing them easier, as
issues arising in developing economies and developmental states can
further complicate already complex comparative analyses. 95 Third,
Japan and Singapore present the opportunity to examine stewardship
within Asia along several interesting and important dimensions, which
allow the authors to consider how certain legal, economic, institutional,
and cultural factors may impact the functioning of stewardship in Asia.
Indeed, Japan and Singapore have clear differences in terms of their
size, geography (north versus south), legal traditions (civil/United
structure
shareholding
commonwealth),
versus
States-mixed
(dispersed/stable-cross shareholder dominated versus state/family
and
block shareholder dominated), institutional architectures,

business cultures.
Japan, at first glance, seems an unlikely candidate for United
Kingdom-style stewardship, with a largely civil law-based legal
tradition and a recent history rich in United States-inspired
transplants. 96 Even if a United Kingdom-style stewardship code were
to be implemented in Japan, it would seem more prudent to expect
differences in implementation and results than otherwise. Yet its
nominally dispersed shareholding structure 9 7 -which distinguishes it
from insider-blockholder-dominated Asia and bears some resemblance
to the Anglo-American dispersed-shareholder
model-and the
presence of passive institutional shareholders suggests that it is one of
the few (if not only) places in Asia where United Kingdom-style
stewardship might plausibly take root. As shown below in Part IV, this
was not to be, and not for reasons attributable to legal tradition but
more likely due to Japan's political environment, corporate governance
system, and business culture. Japan thus illustrates powerfully how a
formally similar dispersed shareholding structure, but a very different
political economy, corporate governance system, and business culture
may nonetheless yield a competing vision of stewardship that all but
turns the original concept on its head.
Singapore is a commonwealth jurisdiction with a legal tradition
and corpus of commercial law that continues to this day to bear

573 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015); Puchniak & Lan, supra note 93,
at 266-72 (discussing the relatively unique nature of Singapore's Americanesque
independent director structure in its corporate governance regime).
95.
See Alan K. Koh & Samantha S. Tang, The Future of The Anatomy of
Corporate Law for Asia: A ForwardLooking Critique, 12 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 197, 198-99
(2017) (noting Japan's classification as a developed economy, and declaring that
Singapore has a 'developed, first-world capitalist economy").
96.
See ICHIRO KAWAMOTO, YASUHIRo KAWAGUCHI & TAKAYUKI KIHIRA,
CORPORATIoNs AND PARTNERSHIPS IN JAPAN 80-93 (2012) (discussing the history of
Japanese corporate law); HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 12-33 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing
the history of modern Japanese law in general.
97.
See Puchniak, Multiple Faces of Shareholder Power in Asia, supra note 20, at
521.
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98
One might be tempted
substantial similarity to the United Kingdom.
of United Kingdomimplementation
and
to speculate that importation
Yet Singapore
straightforward.
relatively
be
would
stewardship
style
where listed
jurisdiction
(ex-Japan)
Asian
typical
a
broadly
is
as family
such
blockholders
by
dominated
companies are ordinarily
groups, and in the case of many of its largest companies, the Singapore
state itself. 99 These contrasting features offer the opportunity to
examine if and how United Kingdom-style stewardship, which is
premised on dispersed shareholding, might work under a different
shareholder environment. Singapore's case may also yield partial
insights for other jurisdictions in Commonwealth Asia, such as
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and India-jurisdictions sharing certain
similarities in their commonwealth legal tradition and family/state10 0
However, Singapore also
dominated block-shareholder structures.
has a unique institutional architecture that has successfully placed
constraints on the state from using its controlling power to extract
wealth-reducing private benefits of control from Singapore's largest
companies and has resulted in the state indirectly functioning as an
engaged shareholder steward at the core of Singapore's economic
success. 101 While understanding this institutional architecture and the
unique role of the Singapore state in corporate governance is critical

for properly understanding the function-or, perhaps more accurately,
lack thereof-of Singapore's stewardship code, it also suggests that the
Singapore stewardship story (like Singapore's highly successful
economy) may be exceptional, and thus difficult to replicate.
From this perspective, even the best comparative case study has
its limits. As illustrative as two case studies might be, more would be
even better-at least to a point. The authors acknowledge that it may
be preferable-at least in terms of scope of coverage-to engage in a
larger-scale study in which experts from a range of jurisdictions

Dan W. Puchniak & Umakanth Varrotil, Related Party Transactions in
98.
Commonwealth Asia: Complicating the Comparative Paradigm, 17 BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
1, 16-17 (2020). (T'1'he most likely explanation is that all our jurisdictions have similar
formal legal rules because of their shared Commonwealth legal heritage. Singapore,
Hong Kong, India and Malaysia traditionally sought guidance on matters of corporate
law reform from other Commonwealth jurisdictions, especially the United Kingdom. The
few cases decided by the Privy Council on corporate law matters continue to be cited by
courts in these jurisdictions even after Privy Council appeals for commercial cases were
formally abolished. There is general empirical evidence that courts in Commonwealth
Asia stand out among the common law jurisdictions that have ceased appeals to the Privy
Council for their propensity to cite UK jurisprudence even after the judicial link was
severed.").
99.
On Singapore's shareholder landscape, see Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79,
at 13-18 (detailing Singapore's corporate structure regime).
100. Puchniak & Varrotil, supra note 98.
101. See generally Puchniak & Lan, supra note 93, at 329-33 (describing the
features of Singapore's regulatory scheme that has prevented the extraction of private
benefits).
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provide a larger number of national reports from which a general
report can be compiled. This is, in fact, currently underway,10 2 and
there may well be other interesting findings when this is completed.

Within the limits of one Article, and the jurisdictions in which the
authors have in-depth knowledge and a high level of expertise, the
goals of this Article must necessarily be more modest. However, at this
juncture, where stewardship has generally been considered to perform

a similar function in Asia as in the United Kingdom, this Article
suggests the findings from these case studies are significant. 103

Finally, as elaborated on in Part V below, Japan and Singapore
illustrate powerfully a phenomenon that the authors have coined "faux
convergence" and broaden the conventional understanding of
convergence-and divergence-in legal phenomena in an age of

relentless transplants.

IV. THE MANY FACES OF STEWARDSHIP: TWO ASIAN CASES
A. Japan: Stewardship against Management and in Service of

ShareholderOriented Objectives
1. The Problem: Perception of Poor Corporate Performance under
Lifetime-Employee-Dominated
Management Backed
by Stable
Shareholders
To understand how the impetus behind Japan's adoption of the
Japanese Stewardship Code (Japan Code) is distinct from the United
Kingdom, the Japanese corporate governance context must be
understood on its own terms. 104 In recent years, an increasingly
popular view within Japan is that Japanese enterprises-including

102. The "Global Shareholder Stewardship Project," led by Dionysia Katelouzou
and Dan W. Puchniak, is aimed precisely at this goal. See The Global Shareholder
Stewardship
Project,
EUROPEAN
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
INST.
(2019),
https://ecgi.global/content/global-shareholder-stewardship-project
[https://perma.cc/AVU7-S9CB] (archived Feb. 3, 2020) (listing information about the
Global Shareholder Stewardship Project).
103. See infra Part IV.C (noting the differences between Asian stewardship codes
and the United Kingdom's).
104. While this Article will not go into the details, readers may find the following
articles helpful as recent overviews of Japan's corporate landscape: Gen Goto, The
Outline for the CompaniesAct Reform in Japan and Its Implications, 18 J. JAPANESE L.
13, 14-17 (2013) (examining the Japanese Company Act's first reform); Souichirou
Kozuka, Reform after a Decade of the Companies Act: Why, How, and to Where?, 19 J.
JAPANESE L. 39, 49-50 (2014) (assessing possible reforms to the Japanese Companies
Act); Hatsuru Morita, Reforms of Japanese Corporate Law and Political Environment,
19 J. JAPANESE L. 25 (2014) (describing the reforms corporate law in Japan has gone
through).

listed firms-have performed poorly, with low return on equity,

productivity,
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and a lack of concentration on core competencies.

10 7

Many of Japan's listed companies have accumulated vast cash reserves
that have been perceived as underutilized. 108 Cash-rich Japanese
companies have come under significant pressure from foreign investors
and some domestic shareholders to either invest their cash reserves, or
return them to shareholders.1 09 Corporate Japan's reluctance to put
capital to more aggressive use has not only kept returns on equity low,
but has arguably depressed economic growth as well. 110 This is
arguably because Japanese companies have failed to maximize capital
productivity by investing in research and development that would lead
to innovative technologies, increase labor productivity, or otherwise
11 Japan's problems are, in
put their resources to more profitable use.
economic
and
institutional
Japan's
with
intertwined
turn,
environment.
Two features of Japan's corporate culture have reinforced riskaverse tendencies of many listed companies. First, lifetime-employeedominated management remains a key feature in many of Japan's
listed companies. 112 Given that insolvency proceedings would likely

105. See, e.g., ITO REVIEW OF COMPETITIVENESS AND INCENTIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH - BUILDING FAVORABLE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPANIES AND INVESTORS:
ECON., TRADE &
INDUS.
7-9
(Aug. 2014),
FINAL REPORT, MINISTRY OF

https://www. meti.go.jp/english/policy/economy/corporate governance/pdf/FRIR.pdf
[https://perma.c/7F7N-BWZV] (archived Feb. 3, 2020) [hereinafter ITO REVIEW FINAL
REPORT] (noting widespread capital inefficiency for Japanese companies).
106. See, e.g., Kawakita Hidetaka OII L'hh ), Kigyono Rieki Kouzou to Kabuka no
1) [Structure of Japanese Companies' Profits and
4 I)ii
foI]fn
Teimei (,t
Sluggish Stock Price], NLI Research Institute Report 20-23 (2012), https:!Iwww.nli[https:/perma.cc/2WPF-B2TV]
research.co.jp/files/topics/39658 extA'_0.pdf?sit=nli
(archived Feb. 3, 2020) (describing perceived inefficiency in Japanese enterprises);
MIYAGAWA TSUTOMU ('M IN), SEIsANsEI TO WA NANIKA: NIHON KEIZAI NO KATSURYOKU
t) [WHAT IS PRODUCTIVITY?:
)1g iivt
/--W
/
WO TOINAOSU ( ']FL

Icf-ih

REVISITING TIHE VITALITY OF JAPANESE EcONOMY] (2018).
SENTAKU TO SHASHO: "KAISHA NO
107. See, e.g., TOYAMA KAZUHIKO (-iIIf[),
'
10
'NLI.1
JUMYO 10-NEN" JIDAI NO KIGYO SHINKARON (iF4)Q -hI
fi5iLi ) [SELECTING AND DISCARDING: THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION OF CORPORATIONS IN
AN ERA IN WHICH CORPORATIONS WOULD EXIST ONLY FOR 10 YEARS] 66-69 (2015).

108. See, e.g., Ishika Mookerjee et al., Japan Companies Are Sitting on Record $4.8
2019),
3,
(Sept.
BLOOMBERG
Cash,
in
Trillion
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-(2/japan-s-companies-are-sitting-onrecord-4-8-trillion-cash -pile [https:Ilperma.cI63NN-Z2HE] (archived Feb. 3, 2020)
(reporting that cash holdings of Japan-listed firms have more than tripled since March
2013 to Y506.4 trillion).
109. See id. (reporting investor-side criticism); see also MURAKAMI YOSHIAKI (fi
tfIL ), SHOGAI TOSHIKA (t
f4li ) [A LIFETIME INVESTOR] 206-07 (2017).
110. See, e.g., ITO REVIEW FINAL REPORT, supra note 105, at 7-9 (discussing
Japanese companies' capital inefficiency).
111. Id.
112. See Caslav Pejovi6, Changes in Long-term Employment and Their Impact on
the Japanese Economic Model: Challenges and Dilemmas, 19 J. JAPANESE L. 51, 66-68
(2014) (describing lifetime employment's effect on Japanese labor and corporate
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result in dire consequences for both managers and employees-largeemployee-managers
have
retrenchment-lifetime
scale
staff
significant incentives to build up strong cash reserves to fend off the
specter of insolvency. 11 3 However, cash-rich companies with low share
prices, as is the case for many Japanese listed companies, would
ordinarily be targets for hostile takeovers. 1 4 Hostile takeovers are

similarly catastrophic for Japanese lifetime employee-managers,
whose incentives and economic situations are extremely different from
American corporate executives. 115 The market for corporate control
should have restrained Japanese companies from amassing massive
cash reserves. But Japanese firms have little to fear; unlike in the
United States, hostile takeovers in Japan have been practically

nonexistent so far.1 16
The absence of hostile takeovers11 7 can be explained by the second
key feature of Japanese corporate governance: stable shareholders.
"Stable shareholders" are a subset of Japan's dispersed shareholders

governance); Sayuri A. Shimoda, Time to Retire: Is Lifetime Employment in Japan Still
Viable?, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 753, 779-81 (2016) (explaining the effects of lifetime
employment on internal company affairs).
113. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
effects of insolvency on lifetime employees).
114. Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 92, at 9 ("[0]stensibly depressed share
values create a mirage of attractive hostile takeover targets in Japan which disappear
when the 'true value' of shares in listed companies in Japan is properly understood.");
see also Alan K. Koh et al., Land of the Falling "Poison"Pill: Understanding Defensive
Measures in Japan on Their Own Terms, 41 U. PA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2020) (noting
the lack of a hostile takeover market in Japan despite seemingly ideal conditions).
115. It has been observed that in the US, listed company managers have vastly
different economic incentives because they may enjoy windfalls and the prospect of
employment at other listed firms in the case of successful hostile takeovers, whereas
Japanese listed company managers may risk losing even modest sums of retirement
money (which may not receive the legally-required shareholder approval were the hostile
acquirer successful), and their re-employment opportunities are much more limited. See
Fujinawa Ken'ichi (#-ii
-), Tekitai-teki Baishu to Taiko-saku wo meguru Giron ni
tsuite (clS Ji7ii l 1L M 3% J 7a2 -o i- b `Z) [On the Debate Surrounding Hostile
Acquisitions and Their Countermeasures], RESEARCH INST. OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS.
(Feb.
13,
2006),
https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/events/bbl/06021301.html
[https://perma.ec/Z43M-3W7B] (archived Feb. 3, 2020) (noting the differences in the
consequences of hostile takeovers that occur in American and Japanese corporations).
116. Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 92, at 5-8 (discussing the dearth of
hostile takeovers in Japan); see also Koh et al., supra note 114 (observing that "not a
single hostile takeover has ever succeeded in Japan.").

117. "We define a successful hostile takeover as one where 1) the bid is unsolicited
and actively opposed by incumbent management; 2) the bid satisfies the mandatory bid
rule trigger (i.e. aimed at acquiring at least two-thirds' of the company's shares); 3) the
bid achieves its objectives; and 4) and the bidder replaces incumbent senior
management, including the board. This excludes management-initiated leveraged
buyouts (MBOs), and partial offers in which the bidder intended only to secure a less
than two-thirds' stake in the company." Koh et al., supra note 114, at Part III. For an

account of shareholder activism short of hostile takeovers, see generally JOHN BUcHANAN
ET AL., HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN: THE LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 153-211
(2012) (detailing the nature of hedge fund activism in Japan).
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who are "sympathetic 'insider(s)' that generally refrain from taking
action detrimental to the incumbent management because of their
1 18
These domestic
existing business relationships with the company."
stable shareholders have supported management against hostile
acquirers even when doing so came at a financial cost, as was the case

in the

Livedoor

and Bulldog

Sauce cases. 119 Further, stable

shareholders often voted in favor of "poison pill" adoption and
renewal.120 The traditional hostility to hostile acquirers shared by
has
management
shareholders and lifetime-employee
stable
functioned as a powerful shield against hostile takeover attempts thus

far.' 2

1

With powerful incentives for lifetime employee-managers to
behave excessively conservatively, and without a market for corporate
122
to
control or an effective alternative such as shareholder activism
discipline them for doing so, there is a spreading perception that the
employee-dominated governance in Japan's listed companies must be
shaken up. 123 Japan's key corporate governance challenges are

118. Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate
Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 203, 209 n.19 (1998);
Koh et al., supra note 114, at Part III.
119. For the judgments, see Tokyo KotO Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 23, 2005,
1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 125 (Livedoor) and Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 7,
2007, 61 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJi HANREISHU [MINsH] 2215 (Bulldog Sauce). See also
supra note 92 (listing sources discussing the Livedoor and Bulldog Sauce cases).
120. See Koh et al., supra note 114, at Part III (noting that stable shareholders
often act against their interests by approving defensive measures).

121. See id. (discussing the aversion that stable shareholders and lifetimeemployee management in Japan have to hostile takeovers).
122. Activism by foreign and domestic hedge funds against Japanese firms is welldocumented. See generally JOHN BUcHANAN ET AL., supra note 127, at 1-7 (discussing
broad themes of the history of hedge fund activism in Japan). The effect of such activism
on Japanese firms is disputed. See, e.g., John Buchanan, Dominic H. Chai & Simon
Deakin, Unexpected Corporate Outcomes from Hedge Fund Activism in Japan, SOC10EcoN. REV. tbl. 4 (2018) (finding generally that hedge fund activism in Japan does not
have the anticipated effects expected from analogous hedge fund activism in the United
States); Tanaka Wataru & Goto Gen, Nihon ni okeru Akuthibizumu no Chokiteki Eikyo
[The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund
' < I f %A O RV]
( F1& s-j=I3 7
(2018),
Japan]
in
Activisn
http://www.jsda.or.jp/about/kaigi/chousa/JCMF/gototanakaronbun.pdf
[https:/perma.ce/BAU7-ZUP5] (archived Apr. 2, 2020).
123. See, e.g., ITO REVIEW FINAL. REPORT, supra note 105, at 2 ("It has often been
asserted that Japanese management, in comparison to their US and European
counterparts, are not distracted by the short-term fluctuations of capital markets and
operate their businesses with a long-term perspective. Large and continuous spending

on R&D and capital investment, long-term employment practices, and investments in
personnel training have all been cited as evidence of this. However, it is questionable
whether truly innovative management decisions, from the perspective of driving longterm sustainable growth, have been made within companies whose management have
relatively short tenures and which lack discipline towards capital efficiency and
corporate value creation. There is also a hypothesis that the continuously low
profitability of Japanese companies is a result of Japan's short-term management style,
which would be in contrast to that of US and European counterparts."). The Ito Review
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therefore not the same concerns behind the original UK Code-that is,
restraining excessive managerial risk-taking and shareholder shorttermism. Rather, the exact opposite appears to be true: Japan's

conservative managers are shying away from the risks entailed in
putting their cash reserves to productive use, for fear of endangering
the long-term financial survivability of the company and the welfare of
their employees. 124
Apart
from the corporate
governance
and institutional
environment, scholars and business insiders have offered two
persuasive explanations for managerial conservatism. 125 First, in
Japan's deflationary environment, the opportunity cost of holding cash
is low given that other uses (e.g., investment) are unprofitable. 12 6 If
managers perceive that Japan's economic recovery is unlikely to be
long lasting, they may also be reluctant to invest their company's cash
reserves. 127 Second, and potentially most importantly, Japanese
companies may have accumulated large cash reserves as a hedge
against ruinous insolvency proceedings. 12 ' Where a company enters

is the report of a working group led by Professor Kunio Ito and was commissioned by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan.
124. Ironically, this approach is arguably at odds with the long-term success of
their companies, and potentially even Japan's economy as a whole. See id. (noting that
the short-term management style in Japanese firms may lead to low profitability and a
lack of innovative ideas aimed towards long-term growth).
125. See Chie Aoyagi & Giovanni Ganelli, Unstash the Cash! Corporate
Governance Reform in Japan 6 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 140, 2014)
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wpl4l4O.pdf
[https://perma.c/U7YK8LW4] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (discussing Japan's deflationary economic environment);
Nobuyuki Kinoshita, Legal Background to the Low Profitabilityof Japanese Enterprises
22 (Ctr. on Japanese
Econ. & Bus., Working Paper No. 316, 2013),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D81RB7DOX
[https://perma.cc/3BND-7T3L] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (discussing cash reserves as a
means of weathering bankruptcy); Haruhiko Kuroda, Governor of the Bank of Japan,
Speech at the International Monetary Fund's 2019 Michel Camdessus Central Banking
Lecture, Overcoming Deflation: Japan's Experience and Challenges Ahead (July 22,
2019) (transcript available at the International Monetary Fund website) (discussing
deflation in Japan).
126. That Japan has been experiencing mostly deflation for decades is not open to
serious question. See, e.g., Kuroda, supranote 125, at 2-5 (discussing the deflation Japan
has experienced since the 1990s)s. Kuroda is the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Japan's
central bank.
127. Aoyagi & Ganelli supranote 125, at 6 ("entrenched deflationary expectations
are likely to be an important determinant of large cash holdings in Japan. A deflationary
environment lowers the opportunity cost of holding cash for both managers and
shareholders. As stressed by Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor Kuroda in a recent speech,
deflation encourages holding cash over alternative more productive uses of resources.
Even though recent developments suggest that Japan has made progress towards
reviving growth and exiting deflation, if firms do not believe that the recovery is longlasting and that there are profitable investment opportunities, they can be reluctant to
reduce their cash holdings."),
128. Kinoshita, supra note 125, at 22 ("The most plausible measure for an
enterprise to avoid business reorganization is building a strong cash reserve. In other
words, cash reserves and bankruptcy protection are two alternatives for a distressed
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insolvency proceedings, senior managers and ordinary employees alike
potentially face extremely unpalatable consequences, as they both face
a higher risk of losing their jobs. 129 Regulations against unfair
core of the
dismissal for permanent "lifetime" employees 130 -the
1
Japanese "company community"1 3 -are significantly relaxed when
insolvency proceedings are launched. 132 To avoid frustrating the
fundamental expectations of key lifetime employees (i.e., lifetime
employment itself in the historic absence of an external labor
market), 133 companies have ample incentives to maintain cash
reserves defensively.
Corporate Japan's conservatism and mediocre performance

would, whether justly or unjustly, come to be attributed to its
by
supported
system
governance
corporate
employee-centric
dependable stable shareholder allies.' 3 4 This cozy arrangement would

enterprise. As the management body of an enterprise counts backward from this
substitution, as they do in everyday business, a rigorous bankruptcy mechanism presses
them to dig a deeper trench by having greater cash reserves."). Kinoshita was at the time
of writing an Executive Director of the Bank of Japan.
129. See Kinoshita, supra note 125, at 24-26 (discussing the effect of bankruptcy
procedures on management and employees).
130. On lifetime employment, see generally Pejovid, supra note 112, at 51-54
(giving an overview of lifetime employment).
131. On this concept, see Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance The
Hidden Problems of CorporateLaw and their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 203-04
(2000) (discussing the positive and integral effect lifetime employment has on the
Japanese "Company Community").
132. Kinoshita, supra note 128, at 26 (noting that the lessening of employee
dismissal restrictions during bankruptcy puts employees at greater risk of losing their

jobs in that period).
133. On the lack of external labor markets as the "dark side" of lifetime
employment, see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and
the Evolution of Japanese CorporateGovernance, 99 COLtUM. L. REV. 508, 508-16 (1999)
(explaining the function of external labor markets and how they become scarce as a
consequence of lifetime employment). More recently, however, lateral hiring has
increased. See, e.g., Megumi Fujikawa, Japanese Workers Call It Quits on a Firm
Tradition:
The
Job
for
Life,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/japanese-workers-call-it-quits-on-a-firm-tradition-the-jobfor-life-1523439004 [https://perma.cc/XSD4-4SCK] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (reporting
increased fluidity in the Japanese job market).
134. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, From CorporateLaw to Corporate Governance in
OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 31, at 10-12
(discussing briefly the features of Japanese corporate governance); Philip Brasor,
Debating the Merits of Lifetime Employment, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 1, 2014),
https://www.japantimes.coejp/news/2014/11/01/national/media-national/debatingmerits-lifetime-employment/ [https:I/perma.cc/GRW2-6MAS] (archived Feb. 17, 2020)
(reporting that the lifetime employment system is not based on skills or productivity and
could drag down the performance of a company); In Japan, a New Kind of Business
School
is Retraining Jaded Salarymen, ECONOMIST
(Dec.
20,
2016),
https://www.economist.com/business/2016/12/20/in-japan-a-new-kind-of-businessschool-is-retraining-jaded-salarymen [https://perma.cc/BJ55-5DB9] (archived Feb. 5,
2020) (noting the increased interest in second careers in Japan); Yasuhiro Arikawa et
al., CorporateGovernance, Employment, and FinancialPerformanceof JapaneseFirms:
A Cross-country Analysis 19-20 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus. Discussion
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find itself in the gunsights of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led
national government headed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.13 5
2. The Liberal Democratic Party Administration's Grand Design
Towards the end of Abe's second term as Prime Minister, the Abe
administration introduced its "Japan Revitalization Strategy" in June
2013 to snap Japan out of its decades of deflation, and to achieve a
vibrant economy that will register over 2 percent labor productivity
improvement in the medium to long term, around 3 percent nominal
gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and around 2 percent real GDP
growth, on average, over the next ten years. 136 The Japan
Revitalization Strategy is designed to be one of the three policy

"arrows" of "Abenomics" and takes the form of major structural reforms
to Japan's economy. 137 The Abe administration's expectations for
managers of Japanese firms are set out in the 2014 version of the
Revitalization Strategy document:
What should be done to increase Japanese companies' earning power, in other
words, medium to long-term profitability and productivity and to pass the fruits
of such increase on to the people (households) evenly? First, it is important to
strengthen the mechanism to enhance corporate governance and reform
corporate managers' mindset so that they will make proactive business decisions
to win in global competition for the purpose of attaining targets including
globally-compatible level in return on equity. Particularly, companies that have
achieved the highest earnings in several years should be encouraged to
proactively use their earnings for new capital investment, bold business
realignment, mergers and acquisitions, and other deals, instead of accumulating
138
internal reserves.

Although not expressly stated, it is implicit but widely
acknowledged that the employee-centric form of corporate governance
prevalent in Japanese firms is blamed for corporate Japan's perceived
malaise. 139 It is in a bid to change this status quo that the Abe
administration sought to enlist the aid of institutional shareholders:
At the same time, banks, institutional investors and other financial players must
maintain healthy tension with companies and play positive roles in creating

Paper No. 18-E-084, 2018), (Japanese firms underperform US firms because of Japan's
lifetime employment system and insider-dominated boards).
135. See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan Revitalization Strategy
- Japan is Back 2-3 (2013) (describing Prime Minister Abe's plan to stimulate economic
growth in Japan).
136. See id. at 2 (describing the objectives of the strategy).
137. See id. at 1 (discussing the Abe administration's "three prongs of economic
revival" and the Revitalization Strategy's role as the third of them).
138. See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan Revitalization Strategy
Revised in 2014 - Japan's Challenge for the Future 5 (2014) (discussing strategies to
increase profitability).
139. See, e.g., KAZUHIKO, supra note 107, at 25-28.
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values in the long term and improving their "earning power." Among them,
banks and trading houses must promote return-oriented risk money provision,
including contributions to private-sector equity and mezzanine finance

investment through funds, and offer good judgments and advice with a view to
supporting companies' business restructuring. Institutional investors, including
those managing public and quasi-public funds, are called on to appropriately
manage their investment portfolios and proactively perform their governance

functions as investors.

1 40

The ultimate goal is to "allow corporate earnings to expand
further, bringing about a true virtuous cycle where the fruits of the
breakaway from deflation will be returned finally to the people through

various channels including increases in employment opportunities,
wages and dividends." 141 In sum, corporate governance reformsincluding the Japan Code-that were subsequently initiated should be
understood as a state-led attempt at promoting shareholder-oriented
corporate governance for the purpose of changing the traditional
stakeholder-oriented governance system of Japanese companies so as
14 2
Now that the context
to improve productivity and corporate value.
of the Japan Code
the
details
onto
to
move
it
is
time
has been set out,
in the next subpart.
3. Japanese Stewardship Code
The Japan Code was first drafted by the Council of Experts on the
14 3
organized by the Financial
Stewardship Code (Council of Experts)
agency that regulates
A
government
(FSA).
Japan
of
Services Agency
sectors, 14 4 the FSA
and
insurance
investment,
securities,
the banking,
keeps track of the implementation of the Japan Code by institutional
145
investors and maintains an updated list of signatories on its website

140. Japan Revitalization Strategy Revised in 2014, supranote 138, at 6.
141. See id. (stating the anticipated effects of the Revitalization Strategy).
142. See Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes: The Case of Japan,
15 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 365, 396-97 (2019) [hereinafter Goto, The Logic and Limits of
Stewardship Codesj (discussing the effects and perceived goals of Japan's Stewardship
Code, particularly compared to the United Kingdom's code); Sadakazu Osaki, The New
Stewardship Code in Japan: Comparison with the UK Code and its Implementation, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF JAPAN 101, 110 (Hiroshi Oda ed.,
2018) ("The Japanese Stewardship Code was introduced by the government in order to
promote economic recovery through increased corporate profitability, the latter to be
achieved by enhancing effective corporate governance.").
143. See The Council of Experts on the Stewardship Code, FIN. SFRvs. AGENCY,
https://www. fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/index.html (last visited Mar.
17, 2020) [https://perma.ce/UU2T-KTQZ] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (compiling documents
related to the activities of the Council of Experts on the Stewardship Code).
[Act for the Establishment of
144. See, e.g., Kin'yu-cho Secchi Ho (' iiti TF)
the Financial Services Agency], Law No. X of XXXX, arts. 3, 4 (Japan).
145. Stewardship Code: 280 institutionalinvestors have signed up to the Principles
for Responsible Institutional Investors as of March 13, 2020, FIN. SERVS. AGENCY,
httpsa/www.fsa.go.jplen/referlcouncils/stewardship/20160315.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2020) [https://perma.cc/5U7B-K3L3] (archived Apr. 2, 2020).
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Against a backdrop of complex, interconnected, and simultaneous
activities by various interest groups,1 46 the first version of the Japan
Code was introduced in 2014.147 The Council of Experts Concerning
Follow-up of Japan's Stewardship Code and Japan's Corporate

Governance Code, 14

8

also organized by FSA jointly with the Tokyo

Stock Exchange, reviewed the state of implementation of the two codes,
and subsequently recommended that the Japan Code be revised.1 49 A
second version of the Japan Code was introduced following revisions

by the Council of Experts on May 29, 2017.150
The Japan Code was introduced to apparently encourage
institutional shareholders to act as good stewards to prioritize the
enhancement of "the medium-to long-term investment return for their
clients and beneficiaries (including ultimate beneficiaries) by
improving and fostering the investee companies corporate value and
sustainable growth through constructive engagement or purposeful
dialogue based on in depth knowledge of the companies and their
business environment."151 In emphasizing the importance of long-term
profit and the interests of ultimate beneficiaries, the purpose of the

Japan Code seems, on its face, to be consistent with the UK Code. 152
However, the purpose of the Japan Code is rather less prosaic
when considered in light of Japan's corporate governance and economic
context: its goal no less than the fundamental alteration of the
relationship between domestic institutional investors and company
management. Domestic institutional investors have been criticized for
enjoying a cozy relationship with lifetime-employee managers, 5 3 such
that institutional investors were content to receive lower returns on
their investments, even though doing so arguably came at the expense
of the ultimate beneficiaries. The Japan Code is thus intended to

146. For an account in English, see Goto. The Logic and Limits of Stewardship
Codes, supra note 142, at 387-92 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the
development of the first Japan Code).
147. See id. at 368 n.2 (stating the timing of the Japan Code's introduction).
148. See The Council of Experts Concerning the Follow-up of Japan'sStewardship
Code and Japan's Corporate Governance Code,
FIN.
SERVS.
AGENCY,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/follow-up/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/YDZ7-THU3] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (collecting documents relating to
the activities and functioning of the Council of Experts).
149. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes supra note 142, at 368
n.2 (acknowledging the 2017 revision to the Japan Code).
150. See id. (noting the 2017 Japan Code revision).
151. See PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (JAPAN'S
STEWARDSHIP
CODE),
FIN.
SERVS.
AGENCY
2
(Feb.
26,
2014),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20140407/01.pdf
[https://permace/5M32-T97Z] (archived Apr. 2, 2020) [hereinafter JAPAN'S STEWARDSHIP
CODE 2014] (defining "stewardship responsibilities in the context of the Code); see Goto,
The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 386-87 (summarizing
briefly the priorities of the Code's preface).
152. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 371
(comparing the prefaces of the Japanese and UK stewardship codes).
153. See id. at 395 (noting examples of such criticism).

2020]

DIVERSITY OFSHAREHOILDER STEWARDSHIP IN ASIA

86 1

encourage domestic institutional investors to pursue higher returns for
their beneficiaries by exerting more pressure on management through
"constructive engagement."1 5 4 In addition, the Japan Code requires
that passive funds actively engage with investee companies and
exercise their voting rights.15 5 As this is arguably not in the interests
of beneficiaries of passive funds, the better explanation is that it is part
of the Abe Administration's policy design to transform the orientation
156
of the Japanese corporate governance system.
To be clear, the Japan Code does not-expressly or implicitly
contemplate United States-style hedge fund activism from Japan's
institutional investors and, in fact, does not require institutional
investors to make any specific demands of management.' 5 7 However,
given the existing political and economic context, one might reasonably
conclude that domestic institutional investors would be expected to
exert pressure on management to use existing cash reserves more
effectively to boost corporate earnings and productivity. This would be
consistent with the prevailing criticism of Japanese companies and
5 8
with the Abe administration's stated economic goals.1
At present, the Japan Code-or at least part of it-appears to
have had a limited, but nonetheless significant, impact on institutional
investor behavior. Since it was revised in 2017, the Japan Code has
required institutional investors that have signed up to the code to
disclose their voting records by individual agenda item, and where the
investor declines to disclose their voting reasons, to "proactively

154. See JAPAN'S STEWARDSHIP CODE 2014, supra note 151, at 4 (discussing the
role of constructive engagement, also defined as purposeful dialogue, in the Code and its
aims); see also Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 38687 (noting the Code's goal of higher returns).
(JAPAN'S
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
155. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
STEWARDSHIP
CODE),
FIN.
SERVS.
AGENCY
13
(May
29,
201.7),
1
https://www.fsago.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20170529/0 .pdf
REVISED
[hereinafter
(archived Apr. 2, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/62ST-ENEF]
STEWARDSHIP CODE] (tasking institutional investors to be proactive in their level of
engagement and voting to increase medium- to long-term growth).
156. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 40304 (discussing how the Code's assignment of active engagement responsibilities to
institutional investors may cut against the interest of the firms' ultimate beneficiaries,

namely clients).
157. See id, (noting the discretion the Code gives to institutional investors to
determine how to pursue their activism).
158. See id. (discussing the aims of the Abe administration as demonstrated by the
Code); Hideaki Miyajima & Takuji Saito, Corporate Governance Reforms under the
Abenomics: the Economic Consequences of Two Codes, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE ABE GOVERNMENT AND ABENOMICS REFORMS §§ 3.1-3.2 (Takeo Hoshi & Phillip Y.
Lipsey eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) (discussing the Japan Code's
effect on institutional investor behavior and the expectation that reforms under
Abenomics through the Stewardship Code and the Corporate Governance Code would
"improve the attractiveness of the Japanese stock market").
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explain" and give reasons for doing so. 159 This disclosure requirement
was initially rejected by the Council of Experts when the original 2014
code was drafted, but was ultimately introduced over the objections of
various listed companies and institutional investors.1 6 0 Despite this,
since the new disclosure requirement went into effect, almost all major
trust banks, insurance companies, and investment advisors have since
complied with the disclosure requirement-with few, if any, opting
against disclosure-apparently under strong pressure from the
FSA. 1 61 The stated rationale for the disclosure requirement was to
"enhanc[e] visibility for institutional investors"; 162 presumably to
increase transparency for ultimate beneficiaries and to ensure that
asset managers took appropriate actions to manage conflicts of
interest.16 3
The disclosure requirement appears to have had some tangible
effect on institutional investor behavior on at least one corporate
governance issue: there is some evidence that the disclosure
requirement has substantially reduced support for the Japanese
"poison pill."1 64 Given the practical absence of hostile takeovers in
Japan, the Japanese "poison pill" was of questionable utility and

i T 1TH uiM I 4 G,

159. See REVISED STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 155, at 15 (laying out voting
disclosure requirements for institutional investors). This is discussed in Goto, The Logic
and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 401-03.
160. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 393
n.131, 402 (noting the addition of Guidance 5-3 despite opposition).
161. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun ( i
(Cf r Aih[aU), Nihon Seimei to Kinyucho,
L4:
iM
,
Y
'
Giketsuken Koshi no Kaiji de Niramiau (]
' 5) [Nippon Life Insurance at Odds with Financial Services Agency on Disclosure of
Voting
Results],
NIKKEI
(Jan.
31,
2018),
https//www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO26191040W8A120ClXi2000/
[https://perma.cc/C66N-EHCX] (archived Feb. 5, 2020); Nihon Keizai Shimbun (0 Ax
O -M ), Nissei, Giketsuken Koshi wo Kobetsu Kaiji (H `I_, & &fii°; Wr)
[Nippon Life Insurance To Disclose Its Individual Voting Records], NIKKEI (Jan. 21,
2019),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZ040269240R20C19A1EE9000/
[https://perma.cc/6JZQ-DFRV] (archived Feb. 5, 2020).
162. REVISED STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 155, at 15 (Guidance 5-3).
163. "The revised code, however, decided to override such objections and to
introduce this requirement in order to enhance the transparency of the stewardship
activities of asset managers and to eliminate concerns on conflicts of interest of asset

managers who belong to financial conglomerates." Goto, The Logic and Limits of
Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 393 n.131 (citing REVISED STEWARDSHIP CODE,
supra note 155, at 15 n.15) ("Some concern has been expressed that company-specific
voting disclosure on an individual agenda item basis may result in attracting excessive
attention solely to the results of 'for' or 'against', and it may prompt mechanical voting
by institutional investors. However, it is important that asset managers enhance the
transparency of their activities to their ultimate beneficiaries of the assets they manage.
Furthermore, it is important that asset managers, who often belong to financial groups,
disclose company-specific voting records on an individual agenda item basis in order to
eliminate concerns that they may not take appropriate actions to manage conflicts of
interest.").
164. See Koh et al., supra note 114, at 45-48 (noting how the disclosure
requirement disincentivizes the maintenance of defensive measures).
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effectiveness. 16 5 Insofar as the disclosure requirement appears to have
effectively discouraged institutional investors from making voting
decisions that were not at least defensible from a commercial
perspective, the Japan Code arguably represents a step towards
greater accountability from institutional investors. Yet, perhaps
paradoxically from the United Kingdom's perspective, the Japan Code
seems to promote, or at least incentivize, a more arguably shorttermist orientation among institutional investors that emphasizes
short-term share prices-a feature that places it in stark contrast to
enlightened
the UK Code's image of the long-term-oriented

shareholder.1 6 6
One might reasonably question why the Abe administration
elected to use the medium of a "stewardship code" to implement its
desired corporate governance changes. Japan is a civil law jurisdiction,
whereas the concept of a stewardship code was introduced by the
United Kingdom, a common law jurisdiction. The answer may lie with
the mutable nature of stewardship, which enabled Japan to introduce
the idea that institutional investors should be loyal to the interests of
beneficiaries, without triggering technical discussions on the precise
elements of fiduciary duties and the legal consequences of their
breach.' 6 7 Further, the idea of a soft law "code" may also have been
appealing to Japanese policymakers, as soft law codes need not be put
through the full legislative process in order to be implemented. On this
point, soft law codes to some extent resemble 168 gyesei shido
(administrative guidance16 9 ) that was once prevalent, but which has
since gone out of favor.

165. See id. at 27-32 (discussing the lack of a hostile takeover market in Japan
and puzzling over the continued use of defensive measures like the poison pill).
166. On the connection between the U.K. Code and enlightened shareholder value,
see Iris H.Y. Chiu, InstitutionalShareholdersas Stewards: Toward a New Conception of
CorporateGovernance, 6 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 387, 398 (2012) ("It is arguable
that the Stewardship Code's preference for the 'long-term horizon' of institutional
shareholders is consistent with the 'enlightened shareholder value' rhetoric championed
by policy-makers in the reforms leading up to the Companies Act.").
167. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 370
nn.13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the avoidance of the use of the term
"fiduciary" in stewardship codes in order to broaden the number of actors the codes
cover).
168. Milhaupt made a similar observation. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Evaluating
Abe's Third Arrow: How Significant are Japan'sRecent CorporateGovernanceReforms?,
in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF JAPAN, supra note 142, at 65,
73 ("Perhaps 'soft law' is expanding as an approach to corporate governance reform
. .
Has
because it is in the DNA of Japanese regulators and policy makers
'administrative guidance' been resurrected in the twenty-first century Japan as 'soft

law'?").
169. A classic scholarly definition of administrative guidance is "[a]dministrative
activities which administrative organs provide to other parties without legal binding
force but in expectation of specific actions (either feasance or non-feasance) in order to
realize an administrative aim." Hiroshi Shiono, Administrative Guidance in Japan
(Gyosei-Shido), 48 INT'L RFv. ADMIN. Sc. 239, 239-40 (1982). Cf. the legal definition as
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B. The Singapore Case Study: Similar Name, Divergent Functions 7 0
1. Stewardship as a Mechanism for Signaling and Maintaining the

Status Quo
In contrast with the United Kingdom or Japan, there is nothing to
suggest that the Singapore Stewardship Code-released in November
2016-was adopted in response to any systemic economic problem.
Rather, the point of departure is that Singapore already had in place a
successful corporate governance system built on two types of
controlling blockholders: family-controlling shareholders and the
state's investment arm, Temasek Holdings (Temasek).1 7 The problem
of rationally passive institutional investors holding substantial equity
stakes in listed companies and failing to rein in managerial risk taking
and short-termism-which gave rise to the UK Code in 20101 7 2 -has
never existed in Singapore. To the contrary, in Singapore's successful
state-controlled and family-controlled system of corporate governance,
almost all listed companies have had, and continue to have, an engaged
"shareholder steward" in the form of a controlling shareholder. 173
Contrary to the conventional (Anglo-American) wisdom, as Singapore
has transformed from a developing, to developed, and now to a world
leading economy, its shareholder landscape has become even more
concentrated, with institutional investors having minimal influence in
17 4
its corporate governance system.
In this context, it would seem that the UK Code would be entirely
unsuitable for transplant into Singapore. With a successful corporate

provided in the Administrative Procedure Act: "guidance, recommendations, advice, or
other acts by which an Administrative Organ may seek, within the scope of its duties or
processes under its jurisdiction, certain action or inaction on the part of specified persons
in order to realize administrative aims, where the acts are not Dispositions". Gyosei
[Administrative Procedure Act], Law No. 88 of 1993, art. 2(vi)
tetsuduki-ho (i iSci if')
(translation from Japanese Law Translation).
170. See generally Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79 (demonstrating how Singapore
has inverted the model of investor stewardship adopted by the UK and arguing that
Singapore's stewardship code provides a model for corporate governance in Asia).
171. See id. at Part IILB (arguing that the Singapore Stewardship Code reinforces
an already successful corporate governance system). For a rich description of family
controlling shareholders and Temasek in Singapore's corporate governance
environment, see id. at Parts IV and II.B respectively.
172. See supra Part II; see also Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part IA
(giving background on the creation of the UK Code).
173. See De La Cruz et al., supra note 24, at 12, 36-37 (based on an analysis of 195
listed companies representing eighty-three percent of total market capitalisation in
Singapore, finding that institutional investors held twelve percent of market
capitalisation weighted ownership); Tan et al., supra note 93, at 91 (stating that running
controlled companies efficiently serves Temasek's long-term interests); Lan & Varottil,

supra note 94, at 575-78 (noting that most countries outside the US and UK are
"dominated by companies with concentrated shareholding").
174. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part II (identifying differences
between shareholders in the UK and Singapore).
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governance system designed to have the state indirectly act as a longterm engaged shareholder steward in state-controlled companies, and
family owners acting as long-term engaged stewards in family firms, it
would seem that Singapore had little need for a mechanism to create
long-term engaged shareholder stewards-which is precisely what the
175
Further, the idea at the core
original UK Code was designed to do.
have the potential to
shareholders
of the UK Code is that institutional
they have
collectively
because
stewards
become effective shareholder
the
United
of
in
most
rights
voting
the
of
control over a majority
17 6
UK
if
the
goes,
theory
as
the
Therefore,
companies.
Kingdom's listed
as
"good
to
act
them
to
incentivize
forces
market
Code could harness
stewards," institutional investors would have the legal voting rights to
17 7
carry out this laudable objective.
Singapore's shareholder landscape stands in stark contrast to the
United Kingdom's: institutional investors only constitute a small
minority of shareholders in most listed companies, and therefore lack
any real power in the face of large dominant state or family-controlling
shareholders. 178 There is research by leading corporate governance
experts-including some from Singapore-showing that institutional
shareholders are seen to play a negligible role in Singapore corporate
governance, especially when contrasted with the dominant role of state
and family-corporate controllers. 179 In this light, the striking
similarity between the texts of the seven core principles in the UK Code
and Singapore Stewardship Code is puzzling. 180 Why has a UK
corporate governance mechanism, designed for a problem that does not
exist in Singapore, which provides for a solution that is unavailable in
181
Singapore, been implemented in Singapore?
Dan Puchniak and Samantha Tang's recent in-depth analysis of
18 2
They
stewardship in Singapore provides an answer to this puzzle.
demonstrate that the adoption of a United Kingdom-style code in
Singapore is a product of regulatory design for the purpose of

175. See supra Part II; see also Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part I (noting
that the UK Code was a response to apathetic institutional investors).

176. See id.
177. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part V (noting that both the UK Code
and Singapore Stewardship Code promote the use of "collective voting power to monitor
management").
178. See generally Lan & Varottil, supra note 94 (explaining that Singapore's
corporate governance challenges generally arise from Singapore's concentrated
shareholding landscape).
179. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
180. Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 16.
181. The authors are unable to identify any statement from Stewardship Asia or
in the Singapore Stewardship Code describing the relationship between the UK Code
and the Singapore Stewardship Code. Some scholars have observed that the Singapore
Stewardship Code may be characterized as being "inspired" by the UK Code. See, e.g.,
LIM, supra note 24, at 280.
182. See generally Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79 (exploring similarities and
differences between the UK Code and the Singapore Stewardship Code).
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signaling. 183 Consistent with other recent corporate governance
reforms, the adoption of a stewardship code that superficially mirrors
the text of the UK Code is driven by Singapore's desire to send a signal
that it is part of the global shareholder stewardship movement-which
has become an important indicia of good corporate governance. 184
From this perspective, Singapore's superficial adoption of a United
Kingdom-style stewardship code makes perfect sense. This regulatory
strategy is consistent with Singapore's history of signaling compliance
with global norms of good corporate governance, while functionally
maintaining the uniqueness of its successful corporate governance
system.185

However, if one drills down beyond a superficial textual analysis
of the seven principles in the Singapore Stewardship Code, its unique
local characteristics become clear. 186 An important feature that

distinguishes the Singapore Stewardship Code from the UK Code is
that it was not launched or promoted by a government regulatory body,
but rather by an ostensibly private entity called "Stewardship Asia. 18 7
The fact that a nongovernment entity launched and promoted the
Singapore Stewardship Code may appear to make Singapore similar to
jurisdictions like the United States where institutional investors have
established a private entity to launch and promote market-based,
ground-up, stewardship principles. 188 However, Puchniak and Tang's
detailed analysis of public company records, press statements, and
business journalism reveals that although Stewardship Asia is a
private entity, it is far from a market-based initiative without
government involvement. 189 To the contrary, their research
demonstrates that Stewardship Asia is intimately connected to the
Singapore government through Temasek:
Temasek funds Stewardship Asia, Stewardship Asia is part of the Temasek
group, and [1 Temasek had a hand in Stewardship Asia's early efforts at drafting
and promoting the Singapore Stewardship Code. Temasek indirectly funds
Stewardship Asia through the Temasek Trust, Temasek's philanthropic arm.

183. See id. at Part I (noting that Singapore uses "halo signaling" to show
conformance with "Anglo-American-cum-global norms of 'good' corporate governance"
while retaining their traditional model of corporate governance).
184. See id.
185. See Puchniak & Lan, supra note 93, at 288-89, 332 (showing that Singapore
has successfully performed similar signaling in the past).
186. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79 (arguing that, while the Singapore
Stewardship Code initially appears weak, it actually reinforces Singapore's successful
corporate governance system).
187. For a detailed description of the relationship between Stewardship Asia and
Temasek, see id.
188. See id. (explaining that the Singapore Stewardship Code allows investors to
set their own standards for stewardship); see also Hill, supra note 7, at 506-13
(identifying the US stewardship code as investor-led).
189. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79 (describing the relationship between
Temasek and Stewardship Asia).
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The Temasek Trust 'manages 19 philanthropic endowments and gifts from
Temasek and other donors', and provides a 'sustainable 4% endowment funding
190
rate' for entities that it supports, which includes Stewardship Asia

The fact that Stewardship Asia is a de facto arm of Temasek is

significant. Temasek is the controlling shareholder of most of
Singapore's largest listed companies. 191 As such, the entity that
designed and promotes the Singapore Stewardship Code (i.e.,
Stewardship Asia) is an "arm of Singapore's most powerful controlling
shareholder: the Singapore government through its wholly-owned
holding company Temasek" 192 When viewed in this light, one would
expect that the Singapore Stewardship Code would be designed to
maintain the status quo for Singapore's successful state-controlled and
family-controlled system of corporate governance. Similarly, one would
also expect that the seven principles in the Singapore Stewardship
Code would not be enforced in a way to bring about intense market
pressure by institutional investors with the hope of challenging
incumbent management or the existing controllers-which is the goal

of the UK Code.
Indeed, Puchniak and Tang's detailed analysis of how the
Singapore Stewardship Code has been designed to function reveals
that it is clearly not intended to disrupt the status quo.19 3 Rather; a

granular analysis of the Singapore Stewardship Code reveals that it
has been designed to be a mechanism for entrenching Singapore's

"successful state-controlled and family-controlled system of corporate
which would be "beyond the wildest
governance" 194 -something
1 95
imaginations of the original architects of the UK Code."
There are three features in the design of the Singapore
Stewardship Code that render it "toothless" and distinguish it from the

190. Id. Stewardship Asia was founded in 2011 as the Stewardship and Corporate
Governance Centre, which was a Temasek-led initiative. See Ho Ching, CEO, Temasek
Holdings Private Ltd., Luncheon Remarks at Stewardship Asia 2018 Roundtable (June
4, 2018) (transcript available at Temasek.com) (discussing Temasek's role as a steward);
see also Ravi Menon, Managing Dir., Monetary Auth. of Sing., Address at the Securities
Investors Association 4th Asian Investors' Corporate Governance Conference: Corporate
Governance-Going Beyond the Rules (Oct. 1, 2012) (transcript available with the Bank
for International Settlements) (discussing the role of corporate governance in Singapore).
191. ISABEL SIM ET AL., NAT'L UNIV. OF SING. Bus. SCH., THE STATE As
SHAREHOLDER:
THE
CASE
oF
SINGAPORE
6,
23-24
(2014),
https:bschool.nus.edu.sg/cgio/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/10/SOE-The-State-asShareholder-2014.pdf [https:/iperma.cc/QBZ3-CYE4] (archived Feb. 6, 2020) (identifying
Temasek's holdings).
192.

TEMASEK

REv.,

TEMASEK

OVERvIEW

42-43

(2019),

https://www.temasekreview com.sg/downloads/Temasek-Review-2019-Overview.pdf
[https://perma.ce/DA97-QPSJ] (archived Feb. 6, 2020).
193. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79 (describing the relationship between
Temasek and Stewardship Asia).
194. Id. at Part V.
195. Id.
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UK Code and other similar codes. First, in stark contrast to the UK
Code and many other codes, the Singapore Code does not have any
mechanism to monitor if institutional investors that have "signed up"
to the Code have in fact complied with the Code.1 96 There is thus no
mechanism to determine if institutional investors have complied with
the Singapore Stewardship Code, or to enforce compliance where

institutional investors fall short.1 97
Second, the Singapore Code fails to articulate a singular model of

stewardship with which investors should comply.19 8 The idea behind
the UK Code and other codes it has inspired is that a code sets out
distinct expectations that serve as a common yardstick or measure of

"good stewardship."1 99 This yardstick is essential for the market to
apply pressure to institutional investors to move towards an agreed
singular standard of good stewardship. In stark contrast, the guidance
to the Singapore Code states that investors can "'satisfy themselves
that they adhere to their own stewardship approach in carrying out
investment activities." 200 Stated differently, each institutional
investor can adopt their own vision of shareholder stewardship and
still claim compliance with the Singapore Stewardship Code.2 01
Third, as a natural corollary of the fact that there is no single
model, the Singapore Code does not employ a "comply or explain"
approach. 2 02 There is no forum in which the "explain" part of "comply
or explain" can be performed.2 0 3 The preamble makes it clear that the
Singapore Stewardship Code is not based on a comply or explain model,
as the Code states that the "level of commitment [to the principles] are
matters that are left to each individual investor to adopt, on a wholly

voluntary basis."

204

Viewed through a UK lens, the fact that the Singapore
Stewardship Code lacks almost any "bite" as a tool for disrupting the

196. See id. at IIL.A("there is no effective way of determining which institutional
investors in Singapore have decided to be governed by the Singapore Code.").
197. See id. (stating that the Singapore Code does not identify the investors which
it governs).
198. See generally Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79 (noting that the Singapore
Stewardship Code allows investors to set their own benchmarks for corporate
governance).
199. See id. at Part III.A (noting that the UK Stewardship Code requires
institutional investors to explain any deviations from the code).
200. STEWARDSHIP ASIA CTR, SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR
2016),
6
(Nov.
INVESTORS
RESPONSIBLE
https://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/Section%202%20%20SSP%20(Full%2ODocument).pdf [https://perma.cc/6KG3-T'H4N] (archived Mar. 18,
2020) [hereinafter SINGAPORE CODE] (emphasis added).
201. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part II.A.
202. See id. (stating that the Singapore Code does not provide a forum to offer
explanations for deviance from the code).
203. See id. (explaining that the Singapore Stewardship Code relies on guidance
rather than enforcement mechanisms).
204. SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 200, at 3.
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status quo, and is primarily a signaling device, may be seen at best as
a failure or at worst a corporate governance sham.2 05 Puchniak and
Tang argue that this misses the point. 206 Singapore has an
institutional architecture that has ensured that state and family
controllers' normally function as good stewards-vitiating the need for
institutional shareholders to act as good stewards and suggesting that
the status quo should be maintained (not disrupted).2 07 As such, by
introducing a stewardship code that does not effectively encourage
institutional investor activism, and maintains the status quo for
controlling shareholders, the Singapore Stewardship Code has
while
reinforced Singapore's successful corporate governance system

at the same time signaling its compliance with the global shareholder
stewardship movement. 2 08
2. The Curious Case of the Singapore Family "Stewardship" Code
Singapore's stewardship story would take a curious turn. 209
Almost two years after Stewardship Asia released the Singapore
Stewardship Code, a second "stewardship code" would see the light of

day in October 2018. 210 The "Stewardship Principles for Family
Businesses" (Family Code) is, as of October 2019 and to the best of the
authors' knowledge, the only example of its kind anywhere in the
world.211 On the surface, Singapore's Family Code appears to bear
some broad textual similarities to the 2012 version of the UK Code: it
employs the word "stewardship," and has seven principles.2 1 2 But any
resemblance to the UK Code ends there. Puchniak and Tang's analysis
reveals three significant functional differences between Singapore's
Family Code and the UK Code that make the Family Code truly sui

generis.

205. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at II.B (acknowledging that observers
could see the Singapore Code as merely publicity).
206. Id.
207. See id. (stating that Temasek and family controlling shareholders "effectively
controlled the problem of systematic wealth-reducing private benefits of control").
208. See id. (noting that the Singapore Code embraces the unique institutional
architecture of corporate governance in Singapore).
209. Most of this subpart IV.B.3 draws on Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79.
210. See generally STEWARDSHIP AsIA CTR., STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLEs FOR FAMILY
https://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/SSP(2018),
BUsINEsSES
[https://perma.ce/5JD3-4KZ/B]
brochure-0913_approved%20for%20printing.pdf
(archived Apr. 2, 2020) [hereinafter FAMILY CODE] (delineating principles of stewardship
for family businesses).
211. Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part IvA.
212. The 2012 version of the UK Code that was in force at the time the Singapore
Family Code was developed had only seven principles. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, FIN.
REPORTING COUNcIL (2012), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf
[https://perma.ce/HK3X-B4WB] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
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First, the Family Code does not contemplate any collective action
or intervention by institutional investors; in fact, there is not a single
mention of institutional investors at all. 213 The only "external"
intervention mentioned in the Family Code is by professional advisers
or management-who are, by definition, in a position subordinate to

the family owners.2 14 Rather, Singapore's Family Code is addressed to
"family businesses." 2 15 While it is far from clear who precisely in a
family business is the Family Code's intended addressee,2 1 6 the context
of the code suggests that it is addressed to family shareholders and
managers of family companies. The fact that institutional investors are
not within the scope of the Family Code sets it apart from every other
are expressly directed towards, and
stewardship code-which
contemplate action by, institutional investors.2 1 7 It is worth reiterating
that the UK Code is addressed to institutional investors and that
collective action and intervention by institutional investors in relation
to the management of investee companies is a core feature of the UK
Code 2 1 8 The complete absence of institutional investors-and of any
"external" intervention that would disrupt the family-controller status
quo-from the Family Code demonstrates that it is functionally
different from the UK Code and existing stewardship codes generally.
Second, Singapore's Family Code seeks to maintain the corporate
governance status quo for family companies by entrenching control by
existing family shareholders and management.2 1 9 The Family Code
does not envision any change from family control to outsider, nonfamily
control. Rather, the premise is that bringing in outsiders perpetuates
and sustains the family business. This in effect all but expressly
endorses the continuation of the status quo of family ownership. This

213. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79.
214. FAMILY CODE, supra note 210, at 7 ("[e]xternal professional help such as
consultants can help FBs put together a more robust succession plan").
215. See id. at 1 ("Stewardship is particularly pertinent to family businesses (FBs),
which form a key component of economic activity around the world . . . For our purpose
here, we broadly define FBs to include companies with the presence of family members
as shareholders as well as board members and managers who are able to influence

strategic decisions. We use the term FBs to include family companies, family firms and
organisations").
216. The closest may be "owners and employees." See id. at 4 ("Successful and
enduring FBs [family businesses] build a culture that instils the ownership mentality.
Owners and employees take responsibility and action as well as develop a sense of
collective pride to forge proactive and integrative solutions to complex problems and
dynamic situations.") (emphasis added).
217. See Hill, supra note 7, at 506 ("engagement by institutional investors is an
integral part of any corporate governance system.").
218. See 1UK STEWARDSHIP CoDE 2020, supra note 15, at 17-19 ("Principle 9:
Signatories engage with issuers to maintain or enhance the value of assets" and
"Principle 10: Signatories, where necessary, participate in collaborative engagement to
influence issuers.").
219. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at II1.A ("the Singapore Code is not
designed to significantly alter the status quo").
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is particularly evident from Principle 7 of the Family Code, which
states: "[b]e mindful of succession." 220 In family businesses, a
succession plan is "crucial" because "succession frequently affects the
22 1
The elaborations
family dynamics and survivability of the business."
of not only
the
importance
of
recognition
Code's
reveal the Family
2 22
but also the
grooming internal successors from within the family,
intergenerational
and
224
value of merit, 223 external expertise,

cooperation. 2 25 Principle 7 clearly conveys the overarching premise of
the Family Code: promoting the long-term success of business by-and
while-entrenching existing control by family shareholders. 226 In
contrast, while the UK Code was also intended to promote a long-term
orientation to investment and stakeholder interests, the UK Code
aimed to achieve this by fundamentally disrupting the prevailing
corporate governance status quo in transforming passive institutional
monitor
actively
would
that
shareholders
into
investors
management.2 2 7 Thus, the concept of "stewardship" undergirding the
Family Code has a substantially different orientation from other
stewardship codes because the Family Code was designed to maintain
the status quo-control by family shareholders and managementrather than to disrupt it.
Finally, the Family Code was designed not only for Singapore
family companies but also as a model for corporate governance in

family companies in Asia. This is evident from Stewardship Asia's
efforts to promote the Family Code in countries such as China,
Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as the
22 8
The
involvement of businesses from a range of Asian jurisdictions.
very fact that the Singapore entity promoting the Family Code was
named "Stewardship Asia" rather than "Stewardship Singapore" also
demonstrates that Singapore's stewardship codes were not merely
developed for domestic consumption, but rather to be "exported" to

.

220. FAMILY CODE. supra note 210, at 7.
221. Id.
222. See id. ("Assess the capabilities and character of potential family successors
Adopt a more holistic view of succession, which encompasses household and family
succession.").

223. See id. ("honouring meritocracy").
224. See id. ("Keep an open mind towards including external expertise in both the
aspects of successors and succession. External successors can bring new perspectives,
competencies and networks. External professional help such as consultants can help FBs
put together a more robust succession plan.").
225. See id. ("Create a healthy environment where the older and younger
generations can exchange views with veracity. Gradually, the younger generation should
be given more opportunities to make strategic decisions as they acquire more
competencies.").
226. See id (promoting efficient succession plans for family businesses).
227. See discussion supra Part II.
228. FAMILY CODE, supra note 210.
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function as a corporate governance model for the region. 2 29 In contrast,
there is no suggestion that the UK Code was initially developed for any

purpose other than solving what regulators perceived to be a domestic
corporate governance challenge.2 3 0 The UK Code was therefore most
likely never intended nor designed to be exported as a corporate
governance model for jurisdictions around the world. By creating the

world's first stewardship code targeted at family businesses for
"export" to Asia, Singapore has not only seized the initiative in
establishing itself as a leader in this space in Asia and perhaps also

the world but also functionally diverged from the (at least initially)
domestic orientation of the UK Code.

C. Stewardship Codes in Asia as a Challenge to United KingdomDefined "Global"Stewardship
A superficial textual analysis of the Japan Code would likely lead
to the reasonable conclusion that Japan has broadly adopted the UK
stewardship model. However, an in-depth analysis of Japan's political
economy, corporate governance system, and business culture reveals
the reasons why the intended and actual function of stewardship in
Japan dramatically departs from the UK model. In fact, functionally,
the version of "stewardship" implemented in the Japan Code turns the
long-termist, managerial risk-moderating concept of "stewardship"

employed in the UK Code on its head. In so doing, the Japan Code
demonstrates the vulnerability-or flexibility-of United Kingdomstyle "stewardship" to being subverted-or at least used-for
completely different ends.2 31
Thus, while the Japan Code bears superficial similarities to the
UK Code in terms of form, it is in function a very different animal. It
is also notable that the Japan Code seems to have achieved a small
level of practical success whereby requiring institutional investors to
disclose their voting records has led at least some of them to exert
pressure on a few investee companies to remove their Japanese "poison

229. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part III.C (noting that one goal of
releasing the stewardship code through Stewardship Asia is to maintain Singapore's
position "as an Asian and global corporate governance leader").
230. See Reisberg, supra note 47, at 220-23 (discussing the history of the UK Code
in the context of the corporate governance challenges thrown up by the Global Financial
Crisis in the UK, and observing that "'[a]gainst the bedrock provided by the [Corporate
Governance Code], it is no surprise that the introduction of the [Stewardship Code] in
the UK in July 2010 was closely followed around the world" (emphasis added), but not
stating that the UK Code was developed to be "exported" around the world); see also
Cheffins, supra note 5, at 1009-13 (2010) (explaining the development of the UK Code
in light of domestic developments).
231. Note also that the UK Code itself was based on an older document premised
on a pro-beneficiary philosophy. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes,
supra note 142, at 376-78. In subverting the UK Code, the Japan Code may perhaps be
characterized as a case of poetic justice.
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pills." 2 32 While the full extent of the functional impact of the Japan
Code is still to be determined, there is the prospect that corporate
Japan, absent the "poison pill" and in the wake of rapidly changing
circumstances, has perhaps become a more friendly environment for
United States-style shareholder activism.2 33
In contrast with malaise-stricken Japan, Singapore entered the
stewardship era with a well-oiled corporate governance system built
upon state and family-shareholder control in listed companies. 234
Singapore's two stewardship codes have been designed and
implemented as a package of solutions to forestall-and preempt-any
chance of ill-informed outsiders creating problems in its listed
companies and to promote the success of family businesses. Neither the
Singapore Stewardship Code nor the Family Code impose any pressure
or obligation on existing controllers-state and family shareholdersto undertake any reform. Neither code bows to nor adds to the global
market's clamor for more, and where necessary, stronger engagement
by institutional investors. Instead, Singapore's response is that of
containment, by giving its implicit blessing to institutional shareholder
passivity and withholding any explicit encouragement of shareholder
activism. 235 Moreover, both codes go even further by designing
corporate governance mechanisms that support the entrenchment of
these controllers and management-which is diametrically opposed to
the UK stewardship model of disrupting a risky status quo by creating
incentives for institutional investor driven change.

Finally, the function of the two Singapore codes is that of "halo
signaling" compliance with the international, Anglo-American, norm
of shareholder stewardship equating to good corporate governance
while simultaneously maintaining Singapore's existing successful
system of corporate governance built upon continued control by state
and family controlling shareholders.2 3 6 Singapore's focus on continuity
rather than change stands in stark contrast to the aim of the UK Code,
which was to transform passive institutional investors into
shareholders that would actively campaign for the company's longterm interests. By implicitly allowing institutional investors to remain
passive, Singapore's Stewardship Code and Family Code place the
burden of securing the company's long-term interests on the
incumbent, entrenched shareholder controllers. The fact that the
Singapore codes are designed to preserve the corporate governance
status quo also sets it apart from Japan's Stewardship Code, which was

232. Koh et al., supra note 114.
233. See id.
234. See Puchniak & Tang, supra note 79, at Part I (noting that Singapore
"regularly ranks as a global leader for its efficient business regulation and good corporate
governance.").
235. See id.
236. See id.
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introduced as part of a set of political reforms aimed at transforming
the corporate governance system. In addition, the aim of Singapore's
Family Code to be exported to Asia, and thus perhaps make Singapore
the standard bearer for a new Asian model of good corporate
governance, sets it apart from any other stewardship code which the

authors are aware of.
Despite

substantial

differences

between

themselves,

the

Singapore Codes and the Japan Stewardship Code share a single
striking similarity: these codes all depart from the UK paradigm of
stewardship. As the analysis in this Part has established, these
departures are not by accident or coincidence, but rather are the
product of deliberate and multifaceted policy choices. That two
developed, yet different, Asian jurisdictions independently and
spontaneously "hopped onto the stewardship bandwagon" while

heading off in diverging policy directions should be recognized for what
they are: bold-if implicit-symbols of resistance against and
ambivalence in the face of the UK stewardship model.
Finally, notwithstanding the superficial convergence in the "form"
of adopting a "stewardship code" and the lingo of "stewardship," the
divergence in the functions that these codes were designed to achieve
in reality prompts a further, more fundamental question in corporate
governance: What do scholars really mean by "convergence" and
"divergence"?

V. "FAUX CONVERGENCE": EXPANDING THE COMPARATIVE TAXONOMY

The days of leaders in the field predicting the "end of history" in
the evolution of corporate governance, 237 or that the world will
converge on an Anglo-American inspired dispersed shareholder

model,2 38 are long gone. Rather, as Asia has become the world's engine
of economic growth, the rise of state-owned-enterprises and familycontrolled firms has defined corporate governance in the new
millennium. 23 9 Concomitantly, the United Kingdom and United States
have witnessed the precipitous decline of the archetypical dispersedly
of
with the reconcentration
corporation,
held
Berle-Means
24 0
As a result,
shareholdings in the hands of institutional investors.
rather than jurisdictions converging on a common Anglo-American

237.

A phrase made infamous by Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End

of History for CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. LJ. 439, 439 (2001).
238. See Puchniak, Japanizationof American Corporate Governance, supra note
93, at 22-24 (showing the convergence debate assumed that the endpoint of convergence
is dispersed shareholding).
239. See, e.g., Koh & Tang, supra note 95, at 198-99; Puchniak & Tang, supra note
79.
240. See supranote 2 and accompanying text; see also Gilson & Gordon, supranote
4, at 863-65.
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inspired dispersed shareholder model, a persistent diversity and
continuous evolution in shareholder structure appears to be the order

of the day.
In a similar vein, within many other important areas of potential
structure,
board
(e.g.,
convergence
governance
corporate
codetermination, takeover regulation, and enforcement of minority
shareholders' rights) significant divergence continues to persist. Even
in the European Union (EU), which has made a concerted effort for
decades to promote corporate law harmonization in its single market,
there remains many important areas of corporate law and governance

upon which jurisdictions diverge. 24 1 There is little reason to think that
the next few decades will be any different, suggesting that significant
jurisdiction-specific variations in important areas of comparative
corporate law and governance will remain.
However, as insightfully observed by Jeffrey Gordon, a "global
governance" movement has brought about a remarkable level of formal
2
convergence in certain areas.24 Various initiatives, led primarily by
the IMF, OECD, and World Bank, have created various "tools" of
features that are required for jurisdictions to be considered to have
"good corporate governance." 243 The promotion of these "tools" in
various ways has resulted in the widespread adoption of certain
features deemed to be indicia of "good corporate governance" around

the world.24 4
Arguably, the most prominent examples of this have been the
of corporate
directors and codes
adoption of independent

governance. 2 45 Based on a simple box-ticking exercise, their global
24 6
According to handproliferation as legal transplants is staggering.
collected data by Dan Puchniak and Lan Luh Luh, as of 2017, codes of
corporate governance have been adopted in at least eighty-seven

jurisdictions, and every code of corporate governance ever written
which number at least 245 as many jurisdictions have released several

updated versions-mentions "independent directors."

247

Indeed, the

241. See Gordon, supra note 31, at 51-53 (showing how European Union-led
convergence efforts failed in the face of entrenched national identities).
242. See id. at 44-45 ("Rather, this widespread adoption of corporate governance
reforms has been stimulated through what might be thought of as global governance, in
which the main actors have been the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD.").
243. Id. at 47-49.
244. See id.

245. See generally INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL
AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2017); Puchniak & Lan,
supro note 93; Umakanth Varottil, Proliferationof Corporate Governance Codes in the
of Divergent Ownership Structures, COMPETITION & CHANGE (2018),
[https://perma.cc/Y9J5https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10. 1177/1024529418813832
EUWA] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
246. Puchniak & Lan, supra note 93, at 266-72.
247. See id.
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authors are unaware of any major jurisdiction which has not claimed
to adopt "independent directors" in its corporate governance regime.
However, upon closer examination, this impressive level of
corporate governance convergence is not what it appears at first sight.

As Dan Puchniak and Kon Sik Kim explain, despite boards around the
world increasingly labelling their directors as "independent," the
functions that they perform (e.g., monitoring management; monitoring
controlling shareholders; acting as government lobbyists; or acting as

a conduit for government influence in SOEs) differ significantly among
jurisdictions, which makes comparing them tantamount to comparing
apples and oranges. 2 48 How can one compare an "independent director"
in a Korean chaebol whose main function is to be a government lobbyist
to subvert the Korean anticorruption rules, with one in an archetypical
Berle-Means company in the United States who is expected to mitigate
the collective action problems of dispersed shareholders? The answer

is: it is impossible.2 4 9
This type of superficial convergence, in which convergence occurs
in name only, is "faux convergence." It is "faux" because what appears
to be convergence based on the adoption of a tool of good corporate
governance in name only may, upon closer examination, have been the
adoption of a different tool with different functions-resulting in
divergence rather than convergence. Although the global rise of
stewardship is still in its relatively early stages, the evidence in this
Article suggests that it may be the next significant example of faux
convergence.
As this Article has demonstrated, merely knowing that Japan and
Singapore have a stewardship code reveals little about the impact that
it is intended to have, or actually has, on each country's corporate
governance. Indeed, assuming that Japan and Singapore have
converged on the UK model of corporate governance merely because
they have both adopted stewardship codes would clearly be erroneous.
Similarly, assuming that the adoption of stewardship codes by Japan
and Singapore makes them more similar to each other is also
misleading. The fact is that in the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Singapore, the intended and actual function of their Stewardship
Codes differ significantly-with differences that often run counter to
each other.
The increasing presence of faux convergence has several practical
and theoretical implications for comparative corporate governance.
From a practical perspective, it suggests that efforts by the IMF,
OECD, World Bank and others to promote a common "toolbox" of
mechanisms for good corporate governance may have deleterious
consequences. Such efforts may cause governments to waste valuable

248. See Puchniak & Kim, supra note 29, at 131-32.
249. See id.
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resources on the superficial adoption of tools for good corporate
governance, rather than allocating them to directly addressing their
actual jurisdiction-specific corporate governance problems. This is
because faux convergence increases the pressure on jurisdictions to
formally converge on established norms of good corporate governance.
As these areas of faux convergence develop, they may also result in the
misallocation of capital as investors (surprisingly) appear to rely on
evidence of the adoption of certified tools of "good corporate
governance" as an important metric in their allocation of capital. Not
having independent directors, a code of corporate governance, or
stewardship code in name may perversely make a jurisdiction a less
attractive place to invest because it is seen to not be part of the "good
corporate governance" club. Further, the existence of faux convergence
presents a significant hurdle for comparative corporate law
researchers who may assume that the widespread adoption of common
tools of "good corporate governance" suggests a global trend in how
corporate governance functions-when in fact it does not. This can
happen to even the most seasoned experts, who are aware of the pitfalls
of such assumptions. This seems, ironically, to have been the case in
Jeffrey Gordon's insightful article on convergence and persistence in
which he appears to assume that the jurisdiction's which have adopted
stewardship codes aim to enhance the voice of long-term, stable,
2 50
As
institutional investors-congruent with the aim of the UK Code.
this Article has demonstrated, this assumption is erroneous.
From a theoretical perspective, the ramifications of faux
convergence challenge some widely accepted ideas about convergence
theory. It is often assumed that "national elites may defend [their]
2 51
as they may extract rents
domestic corporate governance regime"
from it. However, it appears that with faux convergence the opposite
may be true. In the case of faux convergence, elites can maintain or

reinforce their jurisdiction's existing corporate governance system or
use the superficially adopted corporate governance tool for a function
that serves their own purpose-while, at the same time, signaling their
adoption of "good corporate governance." As explained above in the
case of Singapore, the government adopted toothless stewardship codes
which reinforced the dominance of a highly successful state-controlled
and family-controlled system of corporate governance, while sending a
25 2
In Japan, the
signal of "good corporate governance" to the market.
LDP was able to use stewardship to execute its political agenda to serve
as one of Prime Minister Abe's famous three arrows, while sending a
25 3
The
signal of "good corporate governance" reform to the market.

250.
251.
252.
253.
intention

See Gordon, supra note 31, and accompanying text.
See id. at 29.
See discussion in supra Part IV.B.
It is worth noting that Japanese policy makers may have misunderstood the
of their UK counterparts and thought that shareholder-oriented corporate
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the interests of

entrenched elites may help explain why some of these tools of "good
corporate governance" have proliferated so widely. It should also be
noted that these entrenched elites may be maintaining a successful
system (e.g., Singapore) or attempting to fix a broken one (e.g., Japan).
The point is not to make a normative claim that faux convergence will
necessarily have deleterious consequences. To the contrary, in
Singapore the early evidence is of success, and in Japan there also
seems to be indications of its positive impact. 254 Rather, this helps
explain a potential motivation for-and channel through which
globally certified mechanisms of "good corporate governance" are
adopted on a superficial formal level, with extremely different intended
and actual functions in practice.
At first blush, faux convergence also presents a challenge to
Ronald Gilson's observation that functional convergence-rather than
formal convergence-is "likely the first response to competitive
pressure because changing the form of existing institutions is
costly." 255 An example that Gilson 25s used to illustrate his point was
the functional convergence in Germany, Japan, and the United States
in terms of the time it takes for companies to replace underperforming
senior management. Although for path-dependent reasons the three
countries have formally maintained their unique systems of corporate
governance, to succeed all three countries needed to find ways within
their existing systems to solve the problem of managerial

underperformance.
There is little doubt that Gilson's observation is correct when
formal convergence requires making substantive changes to existing
institutions. However, in the case of faux convergence existing
institutions can be maintained or reinforced because the superficial
level of convergence may occur in name only. As such, faux convergence
may occur even when a jurisdiction's system of corporate governance
is already functionally competitive because the jurisdiction can
maintain its effectively functioning system while still superficially
altering its form. One can imagine smaller jurisdictions-or even
larger jurisdictions that cannot create global corporate governance
norms-do this to merely be part of the "good corporate governance"
club. Alternatively, countries may opt for faux convergence if they are

governance, which Japan was trying to promote by its stewardship code, was the "good"
corporate governance championed by the UK Code. See Goto, The Logic and Limits of
Stewardship Codes, supra note 142, at 390. If this was the case, it means that there was
no divergence between the LDP's political agenda and the signal it was sending to the
market.

254. See supra discussion in Part IV.C.
255. Gilson, supra note 33, at 338.
256. See id. at 337 (demonstrating that "[e]mpirical studies demonstrate
functional but not formal convergence" in German, Japanese, and American corporate
governance).
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not functionally competitive as it is a way to feign being part of the
"good corporate governance" club without actually making functional
changes, which may dislodge elites or rent seekers. Much more
empirical work must be done to determine the result of such strategies.
Regardless of this, however, the authors suggest that faux convergence
is a real phenomenon that does not fit into Gilson's formal versus
functional taxonomy and should be added as another type of

convergence.2 5 7
Finally, the idea of faux convergence fits well with Gordon's recent

observation of a rise in "divergence within convergence."2 5 8 The nature
of faux convergence lends itself to "divergence within convergence" as
the convergence that occurs is merely at a superficial level. Therefore,
by definition, faux convergence begets divergence in practice.

Figure 1: Varieties of Convergence in CorporateLaw
Convergence on Legal Form

Convergence

on Function

257.

Yes

Yes

No

Formal

Functional

Convergence
(Gilson)

Convergence
(Gilson)

See infra Figure 1 below for a visual summary of the expanded convergence

taxonomy.

258. See Gordon, supra note 31, at 29 ("There has been convergence in many of the
formal governance rules but local applications reveal considerable divergence"); id at
30 ("In 2017, it would also be right to add the role of 'global governance,' the effort to set
standards flowing from supranational public institutions [in promoting convergence].");
id. at 32 ("Section 4 looks at evidence of divergence, particularly 'divergence within
convergence,' which seems to describe the general state of play."); id. at 41 ("Divergence
takes two forms: The first is a non-following of the convergent norm-for example, not
requiring independent directors. The second, far more common is divergence within the
convergent norm: 'divergent convergence.' Evidence of both forms of divergence is found
in the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (2017), a readily accessible current guide
to worldwide corporate law and governance."); id. at 43 ("Do these divergent elements
within a convergent practice matter? The evidence is 'yes, they should.' First, the
particulars of a reform can determine whether it is 'high impact' or not."); id. at 44 ("A
more radical version of 'divergence within convergence' is advanced in a recent volume
on independent directors in Asia, which argues both that (1) independent directors are
'ubiquitous' in Asia, found in higher proportion across more firms than in the 'West,' and
that (2), functionally, there are 'varieties' of independent directors in Asia, differing
substantially from the US variant and differing even within Asia. Adoption of a
transplant, particularly under pressure of foreign investors or global governance
institutions, does not determine how the new institution will function. That emerges over
time, as the transplant is contextualized within the local ecology, and can lead to
significant divergence in practice"),
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CONCLUSION

It is a historical fact that the first stewardship code was created
in the UK in 2010. Since then, a litany of jurisdictions across Asia have

claimed to have adopted United Kingdom-inspired stewardship codes.
Upon first inspection, these codes appear to normally contain the same
seven principles as the UK Code. Thus, it makes perfect sense that
corporate governance scholars, experts, and pundits would assume
that the UK stewardship model has been transplanted to Asia.
However, as this Article's Japan and Singapore case studies
reveal, the reality is much more complex. Jurisdictions appear to have

seized upon the malleable concept of stewardship as a cost-effective
way to achieve their own local goals, while simultaneously sending a
signal of good corporate governance through the act of adopting a
stewardship code. From a practical perspective, this makes it
impossible to draw normative conclusions (based on Anglo-American
values) about a country's corporate governance by merely knowing
whether or not they have adopted a code-local knowledge and context
is key.
From a broader theoretical perspective, stewardship is just the
latest example of an intriguing emerging phenomenon in global
corporate governance: developments that appear at first glance to be
convergence but which reveal themselves upon deeper analysis to be

faux convergence-superficial convergence in form but divergence in
function. The hope is that this Article will lay the foundation for

further research on the cause and implications of this phenomenon and
that it will be a reminder that to achieve true understanding in
comparative corporate governance there is always a need for local
knowledge, context, and expertise.

